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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents three views of anomaly in explanation: the linguistic view, the
perceptual view, and the mechanistic view. The linguistic view is based on the notion
that an anomaly is an instance of logical inconsistency. According to the perceptual
view, an anomaly is a perceptual event which consists of a phenomenon deviating from
a paradigmatic set of expectations. Lastly, the mechanistic view deﬁnes anomaly as a
phenomenon which reveals the predictive failure of a model of the mechanism underlying the phenomenon to be explained. Each view is evaluated in terms of its heuristic
utility, in two ways: ﬁrst, according to how well the view allows one to detect that
there is an anomaly in explanation; and second, according to the resources it provides for exploring diﬀerent kinds of anomaly. Three criteria are used to evaluate the
heuristic utility of each view for anomaly detection: (1) Does the view allow one to
distinguish between anomalies in explanation and non-explanatory anomalies? (2) Are
there explanatory contexts in which a view cannot determine if there is an anomaly in
explanation? (3) Given a view, what are the conditions of possibility for the appearance
of an anomaly in explanation? The criteria for evaluating the heuristic utility of a view
for engaging the question of which kind of anomaly there is are the following: (1) How
well does the view allow one to localize, for heuristic purposes, an anomaly according
to its kind? (2) What resources does the view provide for exploring theoretical anomalies? (3) For exploring phenomenal anomalies? (4) For exploring factual anomalies?
The thesis argues that, as it stands, the mechanistic view is heuristically the most useful for anomaly detection and exploration. It also provides some suggestions as to how
the linguistic view and perceptual views could be strengthened.
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§ 1. INTRODuCTION
1.1. BACKGROuND AND C(NTRAL ARGuM(NT OF TH(SIS
1.1.1. FRI(NDS OF DISCOV(RY. In the post-positivist years, there has been a renewed
interest in discovery among many philosophers of science.1 Since the late seventies,
much attention has been paid to Reichenbach’s distinction between the “context of
justiﬁcation” and the “context of discovery,” which was drawn primarily for the purpose of pointing out that the former, and not the latter, was the locus of scientiﬁc
rationality (1938). Justiﬁcation and explanation were thought to be tractable enough
to be rationally reconstructed using the resources of formal logic; discovery was not.
For many, Popper’s The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery ([1934] 1961), despite its title, did
nothing to challenge this view. Nonetheless, the “friends of discovery” have in recent
years either attacked the distinction outright or called for an analysis of the rational
aspects of the context of discovery. It has not been expected that such analysis would
yield a logic of discovery, that is, a demonstration that discovery could be made to rely
exclusively on deductively valid inferences. Instead, analysis of discovery processes has
yielded descriptions of methods of discovery, which show that discovery can be rational. This kind of analysis has been carried out in various contexts: research on the
traditional concepts of discovery, argued exposition of case studies from the history
of science as well as contemporary science, and the development of computational
models of discovery (Shrager and Langley 1990).
1.1.2. FRI(NDS OF M(CHANISMS. There has also been, during the post-positivist years,
a resurgence of interest in mechanistic models of scientiﬁc explanation (Bechtel and
Richardson 1993, Craver 2002, Darden 2002, Glennan 2002, Machamer et al. 2000,
Wimsatt [1976] 1984, Woodward 2002). The crucial moment for many philosophers
Many or all the views mentioned in this paragraph can be found in Bechtel and Richardson
(1993), Darden (1991), Gutting (1980), Hoyningen-Huene (1987), Laudan (1980), Nickles (1985,
1980), Schaﬀner (1993), Whitt (1990).
1
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of science was the recognition that the biosciences are for the most part committed
to explaining phenomena in terms of the mechanisms which produce them. Yet the
models of explanation which have been the most discussed in 20th c. philosophy
of science have been nomological: Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological
model is frequently taken as a starting point (for an in-depth survey, see Salmon 1989).
But in the biosciences, rarely, if ever, are new laws discovered; it could therefore seem
unnecessary to describe their explanatory activities nomologically. Much more will be
said about the distinction between nomological and mechanistic models of explanation
in §§ 4 and 6.
1.1.3. FRI(NDS OF BOTH. Many of the philosophers of science who are “friends of
discovery” have also been proponents of mechanistic models of scientiﬁc explanation.
The question arises if the interest in discovery and the interest in mechanistic explanation converge. Both interests are typically prefaced as reactions against positivistic
requirements for scientiﬁc rationality: discovery is not necessarily without rational
method and scientiﬁc explanation need not be nomological nor expressed in a formal language. But are mechanistic explanatory processes especially conducive to the
development of methods of discovery? If so, how?
In this thesis, I propose to grapple with this question through analysis of the concept of anomaly in explanation. When compared with other accounts of explanation,
mechanistic models of explanation, I will argue, are especially apt for the development
of heuristics to detect and resolve scientiﬁc anomalies. In § 1.2, I will introduce the
concept of anomaly in explanation and discuss how it is relevant to the above question.
1.2. ANOMALY IN EXPLANATION
1.2.1. LIF(CYCL( OF AN ANOMALY; ANOMALY R(SOLuTION AND DISCOV(RY. Anomalies can disrupt scientists’ eﬀorts to explain phenomena. Moreover, they do so over
a period of time; they have, metaphorically speaking, a lifecycle. Take, for example,
2

perhaps the most famous anomaly in the history of modern science. In 1843, Le Verrier
attempted unsuccessfully to explain Mercury’s motion. He declared in 1859 that the
rate of precession of Mercury’s perihelion could not be explained at that time. The
anomaly became history with the publication of the general theory of relativity in 1915,
at which point it was known that the anomaly had been caused by a problematic theory,
namely, the Newtonian theory of gravity.2
Anomalies in explanation occur when scientists rationally believe that certain theories should explain such-and-such a phenomenon which meanwhile remains inexplicable. Anomalies in explanation often result from failed predictions: certain theories predict a phenomenon (e.g., a perihelion advance of 527″ /century), but a phenomenon appears which reveals that the prediction has failed (e.g., a perihelion advance 43″ greater than predicted). Henceforth, the anomalous phenomenon, insofar as
it stands in need of explanation, reveals an explanatory failure. Explanatory failure is
the ﬁrst indication that there is an anomaly in explanation. Le Verrier sought an explanation for Mercury’s motion for 16 years before announcing that it was anomalous:
while in 1843 there was clearly an explanatory failure, it was not until 1859 that it was
known that the phenomenon which should have been explainable was not. One could
say that early stages of an anomaly are dominated by attempts to answer the question
if there is an anomaly.
Explanatory success is the ﬁnal indication that there has been an anomaly in explanation. Successful explanation of the formerly inexplicable phenomenon entails not
only the knowledge that the anomaly existed, but what the nature of the anomaly
was. Le Verrier had thought that Mercury’s orbit was being perturbed by unobserved
bodies, either a planet in an inferior orbit, or a group of bodies of suﬃcient mass.
None of these were discovered. Modiﬁed versions of Newton’s theory of gravitation
2

For a precise historical account of this anomaly, see Roseveare (1982).
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were proposed throughout the 19th c. to cope with the anomaly, none of which were
accepted as a legitimate successor theory. General relativity of course did resolve the
anomaly. Hence, the nature of the anomaly was known: it had been caused by a problematic theory. One could say that the mature stages of an anomaly are dominated by
attempts to answer the question of which kind of anomaly it is.
This example shows that problematic theories can play a causal role in the appearance of anomalies. But at the same time, anomalies can play a causal role in discovery
and theory change. For this reason, 20th c. philosophy of science, especially in the
Kuhnian and the Popperian schools, has centered much attention on anomaly. More
recently, the “friends of discovery” have taken a great deal of interest in it as well.
The overarching question has been the following: how does attending to anomaly take
scientists from explanatory failure to explanatory success? More speciﬁcally, are there
methods of discovery, which would deserve to be called scientiﬁc and rational, in how
scientists detect and resolve anomalies?
1.2.2. VI(WS OF ANOMALY. In this paper, I will lay out and compare three views of
anomaly in explanation. Each view was developed in the context of a major account
of scientiﬁc explanation in the past century. I have looked for prominent examples
of discussions where anomaly is construed as an occurrence of explanatory failure and
as an impetus for scientiﬁc discovery. While I have found three such examples on
which to base my thesis, I have performed a certain amount of reconstruction in each
case. Distinct accounts of scientiﬁc explanation should give rise to distinct accounts
of anomaly in explanation. However, philosophers of science, while they have sought
to distinguish their accounts of explanation, have not done the same for their views of
anomaly.3 For each view, my interpretive method proceeds as follows: ﬁrst, I examine
At times this has lead to confusion: for example, Kuhn, who denies that successful explanation
in science should presuppose regimentation in a formal language, nonetheless refers to anomalies as
“inconsistencies” and “counterexamples.” While he uses these expressions only in a quasi-logical
3
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an account of explanatory success in order to discern key characteristics of the explanatory
relation; second, I deﬁne anomaly in terms of those characteristics.
In § 2, I reconstruct what I call the linguistic view of anomaly. The section presents
some well-known attempts to deﬁne anomaly in explanation using deductive models.
In § 3, I discuss the perceptual view of anomaly. The section is concerned with eﬀorts
in Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian science studies to adapt Kantian philosophy or gestalt
psychology for the purpose of detecting and resolving anomalies. In § 4, I lay out
the mechanistic view of anomaly. The section considers how anomaly in explanation is
construed in recent accounts of mechanistic explanation.
1.2.3. OTH(R SORTS OF EXPLANATORY FAILuR(; OTH(R SORTS OF ANOMALY; PR(DICTIV( FAILuR( WITHOuT EXPLANATORY FAILuR(. In this thesis, I will examine explanatory failures which indicate the presence of an anomaly. I will also refer to anomalies
as those which entail explanatory failure. But for the following reasons, I do not presume that this thesis provides an exhaustive account either of explanatory failure or
anomaly.
First, not all explanatory failures are anomalies. Eﬀorts at scientiﬁc explanation
may fail for many reasons: for example, misapplication of accepted theories to a phenomenon outside of their domain (e.g., general relativity would fail to explain chemical
synapses); use of discredited theories (e.g., Lashley’s principle of mass action in the prestriate cortex); attempts to explain phenomena which are exceedingly complex (e.g.,
consciousness); attempts to explain phenomena which are supernatural (e.g., resurrection). These and other sorts of explanatory failures will generally not give a positive
ﬁrst indication that there is an anomaly.
sense, he could have avoided using them altogether; anomaly either entails reference to a semantic
relation or it does not.

5

Second, not all anomalies are explanatory.4 For example, failed predictions might
be said to result in anomalies in cases where the predicted phenomenon is not in an
explanatory relation with the theory. Consider laws which have no explanatory power
but which have some predictive power and also occasion predictive failure. This is the
case with the Titius-Bode Law, which was used in the 18th and 19th c. to calculate the
semi-major axis of planetary orbits. The Titius-Bode Law makes use of the following
equation:
a = 0.4 + (0.3)2n
where n is an integer corresponding to the number of the planet (for Mercury, n = −1;
Venus, n = 0; Earth, n = 1; Mars, n = 2; etc.) and a is given in astronomical units. On
the one hand, the Titius-Bode Law was said to have successfully predicted a ﬁfth planet
between Mars and Jupiter: in 1801, Ceres, the largest asteroid of the Asteroid Belt, was
discovered by Giuseppe Piazzi, and it was generally assumed that the asteroid belt
was a destroyed planet. Uranus, once its orbit was calculated, also appeared to provide
conﬁrmation (i.e., for Uranus, n = 6). On the other hand, the Titius-Bode Law failed to
predict the semi-major axis of Neptune. (It turns out that the value n = 7 corresponds
better to Pluto.) Neptune’s orbit might be considered anomalous for the Titius-Bode
Law. However, we will not call it an anomaly in explanation insofar as the Titius-Bode
Law should not be expected to explain Neptune’s orbit.5
Another example of non-explanatory anomaly is the anomalous data point, measurement, or reading. These should be rigorously contrasted with unreliable data which
lead to anomalies in explanation. In the latter case, data may seem reliable enough that
scientists use them as evidence for a phenomenon. Yet it happens that the data are
For a general account of anomaly which encompasses the anomaly types described here and still
others, see Elliott (2004).
5
The question of how such anomalies are useful for scientific discovery is interesting and remains
open to debate.
4
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unreliable and the phenomenon inferred from them is non-existent. The phenomenon
then stands in need of explanation, despite its non-existence, and an anomaly in explanation ensues. (See § 1.3.1 for an example of this kind of anomaly; for an in-depth
discussion, see § 6.3.) In contrast, data are sometimes called anomalous precisely when
they are not used as evidence for a phenomenon. Rejected data points may stand in
need of explanation, but they do not cause the failure in explanation of a phenomenon
for which they do not provide evidence.
For the remainder of the introduction, I will give a synopsis of my method for
evaluating each view of anomaly with respect to its eﬀectiveness within the discovery
process.
1.3. H(uRISTIC UTILITY OF A VI(W OF ANOMALY
In this thesis, the heuristic utility of a view of anomaly will be assessed in two ways:
ﬁrst, according to how well the view allows one to detect that there is an anomaly
in explanation; and second, according to the resources it provides for the purpose of
exploring diﬀerent kinds of anomaly.
The question of how well a view allows one to determine if there is an anomaly
will be addressed in the ﬁnal section of the presentation of each view, §§ 2.3, 3.3, and
4.4. I have opted for this order because how well a view answers the question if there
is an anomaly follows closely from the deﬁnition of anomaly in explanation that the
view provides. Three criteria will be used to evaluate the heuristic utility of each view
for anomaly detection: (1) Does the view allow one to distinguish between anomalies
in explanation and non-explanatory anomalies? (2) Are there explanatory contexts in
which a view cannot determine if there is an anomaly in explanation? (3) Given a view,
what are the conditions of possibility for the appearance of an anomaly in explanation?
How well the views allow one to engage the question of which kind of anomaly
there is will be discussed in § 6. Here the organizing principle shifts to the anomaly
7

kinds, and views will be compared directly with respect to the means they provide
for exploring each one. The criteria for evaluating the heuristic utility of a view for
engaging the question of which kind of anomaly there is are the following: (1) How well
does the view allow one to localize, for heuristic purposes, an anomaly according to its
kind? (2) What resources does the view provide for exploring theoretical anomalies?
(3) For exploring phenomenal anomalies? (4) For exploring factual anomalies? Since I
have not yet introduced these distinctions between kinds of anomalies in explanation,
I will do so now.
1.3.1. KINDS OF ANOMALY IN EXPLANATION. Anomalies in explanation occur only
when the theories, mechanisms, laws, initial conditions, relevant factors, phenomena, or data which are necessary for an explanation enter into an explanatory relation.
Although this relation has frequently been characterized as one of consistency for
successful explanations and of inconsistency for anomalies, I prefer not to limit the
notion of explanatory relation to one which presupposes that the explanatory relata
are linguistic expressions. In both the perceptual and the mechanical views, explanatory relations are conceived of between relata which are not necessarily sentential:
for example, both use systems of visual perception and representation to describe explanatory relations or anomalies. More will be said in the respective sections; here, I
simply want to suggest suspending judgment on the cognitive characterization of the
explanatory relation.
When an anomaly ﬁrst appears, scientists are usually unable to recognize which
kind it is. While the kind of anomaly is unknown, scientists explore the anomaly as
though it were a certain kind. The reliability of the data set may be doubted, competing
interpretations of the data reconsidered, hypothesized mechanisms scrutinized, laws
questioned, initial conditions re-examined, and the list of relevant factors checked for
completeness.
8

In this paper, anomaly kind is deﬁned according to the explanatory relatum which
is primarily responsible for the inexplicability of the phenomenon. For example, the
inexplicability of the advance of Mercury’s perihelion was caused by a problematic theory; this is an exemplar of a theoretical anomaly. A second kind of anomaly includes
those which are caused by unknown relevant factors or erroneous initial conditions.6
Uranus’ orbit was inexplicable because the perturbing force of Neptune was unaccounted for; this is a factual anomaly. The third kind of anomaly includes those which
are caused by the phenomenon to-be-explained itself. Inadvertent reliance on bad data
or misinterpretation of data can result in scientists seeking and failing to explain a phenomenon because it simply does not exist. For example, Neptune does not completely
account for the perturbations in Uranus’ orbit. Neptune’s orbit as well has perturbations, which famously led to the discovery of Pluto. However, Pluto did not account
for the perturbations. The unexplained perturbations in Uranus and Neptune’s orbits
set astronomers scanning the Kuiper Belt for a new Planet X or suﬃciently massive
group of objects throughout much of the 20th century, until a study from the U.S.
Naval Observatory was published in 1993 demonstrating that the phenomena of the
perturbations in the two gas giants’ orbits in fact did not exist as they were based
on incorrect measurements of Neptune’s mass (Standish 1993).7 The resolution of the
In the context of the linguistic view of anomaly, this second sort of anomaly would be caused
by at least one of the auxiliary hypotheses being false, or by a ceteris paribus clause failing to be
corroborated.
7
From the abstract of Standish’s article—
6

It is shown that the alleged “unexplained anomalies in the motion of Uranus” disappear
when one properly accounts for the correct value of the mass of Neptune and properly
adjusts to the observational data. Also, it is shown that each of the “irregularities in
the measured positions of Neptune” has a complete explanation within the framework
of the presently know solar system. There is still no evidence which requires or even
indicates the existence of any planet-sized object; there remains no need to hypothesize
the existence of a tenth planet in the solar system (1993, 2000).
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anomaly has been generally accepted by astronomers. This case is typical of what I
call a phenomenal anomaly.
The following table summarizes the anomaly kinds referred to in this thesis:
Anomaly Kind
Phenomenal
Factual
Theoretical

Deﬁning Relatum
Non-existent phenomenon, viz., phenomenon
based on unreliable or misinterpreted data
Unknown relevant factors or erroneous initial conditions
Problematic explanator y law,
mechanism,
paradigm, or theory

1.3.2. ANOMALY R(SOLuTION. In this thesis, I will make use of the term “anomaly
resolution”; the term is one I picked up from Darden, and my account of the heuristics
involved in anomaly resolution is in many ways indebted to hers (1991). There she
presents a four-step process of anomaly resolution:
(1) Conﬁrm that an anomaly exists.
(2) Localize the problem.
(3) Change the theory.
(4) Assess the results. (1991, 270)
The focus of my thesis is, in a sense, on the ﬁrst two stages. Answering the question
if there is an anomaly runs parallel to conﬁrming the anomaly; similarly, answering the
question of which kind the anomaly is involves localizing the anomaly. However, there
are two important diﬀerences between our accounts.
For Darden, conﬁrming an anomaly involves eliminating the possibility that an
anomaly is caused by faulty data or initial conditions (1991, 271); from there, the anomaly
is resolved by ﬁrst localizing the anomaly with respect to the domain of the theory, that
is, by determining if the anomaly falls inside the scope of the theory. On my account,
aﬃrming that there is an anomaly does not entail eliminating the possibility that the
anomaly is phenomenal or factual. On Darden’s account, both of these anomaly kinds
10

would refer to anomalies which really do not exist insofar as they are disconﬁrmed. This
judgment on what constitutes an anomaly is too restrictive. Long-standing anomalies
have occurred which turned out to be phenomenal: in astronomy, the anomaly of
residual perturbations in Uranus’ and Neptune’s orbits provoked publications about a
Planet X for well over a century (seven papers within just four years prior to the publication of Standish 1993); in visual neuroscience, the phenomenon of macular sparing
has also been published on widely and has remained an anomaly for nearly a century
(Leﬀ 2004). Furthermore, there is an important distinction to be drawn between
anomalies arising from explanatory facts and those arising from theories; for example,
the diﬀerence between the anomaly of Uranus’ orbit, which was caused by an unknown
fact (the existence of Neptune), and the anomaly of Mercury’s orbit, which was caused
by a problematic theory. It seems methodologically impractical to assume that factual
anomalies need to eliminated or disconﬁrmed prior to exploring the possibility that the
anomaly is theoretical. At the same time as Le Verrier and Adams were calculating the
position of an eighth planet, others were proposing modiﬁcations to Newton’s theory
of gravity (notably, Airy, the Astronomer Royal; see Grosser 1962, 48). Thus, aﬃrming
that there is an anomaly, on my account, only commits one to its existence and not to a
judgment of its kind. In addition, localizing an anomaly certainly involves determining
if an anomaly is theoretical; but it also involves determining if an anomaly is factual or
phenomenal.
The second diﬀerence worth mentioning is that my account does relatively little
to describe heuristic strategies of theory revision or formulation, while this, of course,
is the primary goal of Darden’s account. Darden’s heuristic strategies for anomaly
resolution are directed towards improving a theory which is causing an anomaly; the
object of discovery is a better theory. When I ask about the heuristic utility of a view
of anomaly, I am inquiring to what extent a view of anomaly allows one to discover
11

anomalies (here the object of discovery is the anomaly itself) and to what extent a view
of anomaly allows one to resolve diﬀerent kinds of anomaly (here one would ﬁnd a
method of discovery). Even when I discuss the heuristic utility of a view of anomaly
when exploring theoretical anomalies, my main purpose is to compare the three views.
Thus, my account does not pretend to represent a comprehensive view of the heuristics
related to anomaly resolution.

12

§ 2. TH( LINGuISTIC VI(W OF ANOMALY
Scientiﬁc explanation and change were, in early 20th c. philosophy of science, predominantly analyzed by means of linguistic models. In these models, explanatory success is
manifested as an instance of logical consistency. Anomalies appear as logical inconsistencies, typically (although not always) between theoretical statements and observation
statements of some sort.
Here I will brieﬂy outline two logical frameworks, both of which are frequently
referenced in discussions of the traditional accounts of the explanatory process. The
ﬁrst is the deductive-nomological model (the D-N model), the goal of which, as it was
articulated by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, was to provide the structure of
a successful scientiﬁc explanation. The second is a series of models developed for
theory falsiﬁcation. These models have been chosen because they explicitly represent
anomalies. Although models for theory falsiﬁcation are most applicable to cases of
predictive failure, they can also be used to demonstrate explanatory failure whenever
the predicted phenomenon and the theory from which it is derived (in part) are in an
explanatory relation. I will elaborate further on this point in § 2.2.
2.1. EXPLANATORY SuCC(SS: TH( D-N MOD(L
Let’s take an example. Suppose one sets out to explain the appearance of the moon
on a particular night, or more precisely, why the illuminated portion of the Moon has
the shape it does at a certain time. One might list a number of facts about the Moon’s
orbital motion with respect to the Earth, the role of the Sun as a light source, the
reﬂective and spatial properties of the Moon, the refracting properties of the Earth’s
atmosphere, the position of the viewing apparatus, and so on. Hence, one might
subsume all of these particular facts under general laws of geometrical optics to explain
a certain gibbous form on a clear night.
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The D-N model aims to generalize in logical terms scientiﬁc explanations such as
why the moon has a gibbous shape. Thus, a set of statements of geometrical optics
describing the law-like behavior of light rays, together with a suﬃcient set of particular
facts, should have as a logical consequence a statement describing the visible shape of
the moon.
Instantiating the D-N model begins by providing a statement of the “explanandumphenomenon” (Hempel 1965, 336). The “explanandum-statement” should be deducible
from two sets of statements, which serve as the explanans: (1) initial conditions (which
must have empirical content) and (2) general and derivative laws and theories. Hence
the schema—
Ω
Explanans
Explanandum

C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck
L1 , L2 , . . . , Lr
E

(D-N model)

In addition, the D-N model requires that the explanandum statement not be deducible from a set of particular facts alone (Hempel 1965, 337). The explanation should
be nomological as well as deductive. Thus, at least one law statement must be necessary
for the inference. The point of this semantic stipulation is to prevent “explanations”
which invoke laws either not at all or only in a trivial manner. For example, the fact
that the Moon is waxing gibbous this evening follows from the conjunction of the facts
that Venus is waxing gibbous and so is the Moon. But no law has been invoked in this
“explanation.”
2.2. ANOMALY IN EXPLANATION: MOD(LS OF TH(ORY FALSIFICATION
The notion underlying theory falsiﬁcation is that scientiﬁc theories need to be able to
make predictions and thus be subject to empirical testing (Popper [1963] 2002, 47-48).
The scientist endeavors to discern the predictive power of a scientiﬁc theory (i.e., a
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conjecture) and to devise a cha'enge with the aim of refuting it. A failure to meet a
challenge results in an instance of inconsistency.
The following presentation of theory falsiﬁcation is based on Lakatos’ Falsiﬁcation
and the Methodology of Scientiﬁc Research Programmes (1978). I have selected this text for
several reasons. First, Lakatos clearly deﬁnes anomaly in terms of explanation: “An
anomaly in a research programme is a phenomenon which we regard as something to
be explained in terms of the programme” (1978, 72). Second, he clearly deﬁnes anomaly
with respect to a deductive model. His question about the conditions under which
a statement O can be taken to refute a theory is identical to the question about the
conditions under which a statement O can be known to express a theoretical anomaly.
Third, his discussion of theory falsiﬁcation culminates with a concept of anomaly which
has some of the desired features outlined in the introduction: that, for example, an
anomaly’s kind is known once it has been successfully explained and not before; or that
an anomaly (e.g., a “monster anomaly”) has a lifespan.
2.2.1. DOGMATIC MOD(L OF TH(ORY FALSIFICATION. The ﬁrst model of falsiﬁcation
has direct refutation for a goal, and is typical of what Lakatos calls “dogmatic falsiﬁcationism” (Lakatos 1978, 12ﬀ.). It reﬂects a common view of scientiﬁc research
according to which scientists confront theories with observations and throw out the
former if the latter do not agree. Newton’s “crucial experiments” were contrived for
this theory-testing end. With the help of symbolic logic, Popper formulated a falsiﬁcationist model of theory-testing by expanding on this approach (see also Hempel
1966, 7). In its “dogmatic” form, falsiﬁcation consists of a simple modus to'ens between
a theory statement T and an observation statement O that the theory should predict
or explain:
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1

T →O

2

¬O

3

¬T

(Dogmatic model)

An anomaly, under the dogmatic model, is the true negation of an observation statement O such that T and ¬O form an inconsistent set of statements.
While each model of falsiﬁcation varies, they all conform to the following schema:
1

S→O

2

¬O

3

¬T

(Schema for falsiﬁcation models)

where S stands for a conjunction of statements, S1 ∧· · ·∧Sn. In the following sections,
I will refer to an anomaly under the models of falsiﬁcation as Oanomaly,S. Oanomaly,S is the
true negation of an observation statement O such that S and ¬O form an inconsistent
set of statements. Thus, an anomaly under the dogmatic model will be referred to as
Oanomaly,T .
2.2.2. PROBL(MS WITH TH( DOGMATIC MOD(L. The utility of this model for anomaly
resolution would be limited to theoretical anomalies. Simply, if an anomaly were theoretical, one could plug a theory into the dogmatic model and refute it. It would not be
necessary to develop a successful explanation of Oanomaly,T to determine the anomaly
kind. Indeed, anomalies would have virtually no lifespan. At the very moment an
anomaly is discovered—the moment Oanomaly,T is found inconsistent with T —T is refuted and the anomaly becomes part of history. But this is counterintuitive, since the
history of science contains anomalies which outlive generations of scientists.
A second major problem for the dogmatic model is a consequence of a key assumption on which it rests: that scientiﬁc theories forbid observable states of aﬀairs
which can be expressed by observation statements (i.e., the class of Oanomaly,T state-
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ments). The notion that a scientiﬁc theory should forbid certain states of aﬀairs is
critical to any account of theoretical anomaly. Those holding this claim believe that
scientists, when formulating a theory, do so by circumscribing ahead of time all the
possible states of aﬀairs which could potentially give rise to anomalies for that theory.
The connection between theoretical anomaly and scientiﬁc theory thus becomes fairly
strong: as before, theoretical anomalies are deﬁned in terms of theories; but now,
scientiﬁc theories are also deﬁned in terms of their potential theoretical anomalies.
A diﬃculty faced by those deﬁning scientiﬁc theories in this way is that many
prominent theories do not appear to forbid any states of aﬀairs. Let’s take for an
example a well-known theory:
(LCLM) The total momentum of the system of two colliding particles remains unchanged by the collision, i.e., the total linear momentum is a conserved quantity. (French 1971, 310)
What exactly does the law of conservation of linear momentum forbid? Suppose two
pool balls collide and then roll to a halt. To claim that total momentum is unchanged
by the collision, we would need to factor in whichever forces brought the balls to a halt,
such as friction from the felt and gravity. So indeed conservation of momentum only
forbids that the total momentum of the system of two colliding particles decreases
when every relevant factor aﬀecting that system has been accounted for. Thus the
theory alone does not forbid a state of aﬀairs; a ceteris paribus clause is also needed.
This requirement, which is implicit in conservation laws, that all relevant factors (e.g.,
causes of perturbation) have been accounted for before it can be made non-vacuously
true severely limits the scope of application of dogmatic falsiﬁcation.
2.2.3. MONOTH(OR(TICAL D(DuCTIV( MOD(L. There are further complications for
theory falsiﬁcation. The major ones center around the following concern: isolation of
a theory to be tested should not be taken for granted. The solitude of the T statement
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in the antecedent of the dogmatic model may be a desideratum, but it is unlikely. Next,
I will summarize three expansions on the dogmatic model: (1) the addition of auxiliary
hypotheses, (2) the replacement of a single theory with a series of theories, and (3) the
addition of a successor theory to T. Each of these expansions entails an increasingly
sophisticated view of anomaly.
Rarely do interesting theories in isolation make predictions. A quick glance back to
the D-N model should reveal a conspicuous oversight in the dogmatic model: if initial
conditions should be among the explanatory premises of the D-N model, why would
they not be conjoined with theory T in the theory-testing model? One explanation
is simply that the initial conditions, presumably speciﬁed by observation statements,
have already merged into the unproblematic background of theory T. Nonetheless,
this can hardly be assumed at the outset. Initial conditions themselves are also hypothetical in nature. We can determine the mass and velocity for each colliding particle,
but if linear momentum appears not to have been conserved as predicted, an obvious
step for the scientist to take is to re-examine the values for mass and velocity expressed
in the initial conditions, as well as the means by which those values were obtained, prior
to declaring LCLM false. Troubleshooting procedures like this attest to the implicit
(if not explicit) use of auxiliary hypotheses.
The monotheoretical deductive model is an instance of modus to'ens involving (1) a
material conditional whose antecedent consists of the conjunction of a theory T with
various auxiliary hypotheses A1 , A2 , . . . , An and whose consequent is an observation
statement O derived from the statements in the antecedent, and (2) the negation of O.
The model is as follows:
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1

(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An ∧ T ) → O

2

¬O

3

¬(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An ∧ T )

(Monotheoretical deductive model)

An anomaly, under the monotheoretical deductive model, is the true negation of an
observation statement O such that (A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An ∧ T ) and ¬O form an inconsistent
set of statements.
Deﬁned in terms of auxiliary hypotheses as well as the theory being tested, Oanomaly,Ā,T
can represent both theoretical and factual anomalies. Theoretical anomalies occur
where Oanomaly,Ā,T is inconsistent with theory T ; factual anomalies where Oanomaly,Ā,T is
inconsistent with one or more auxiliary hypothesis A1 , A2 , . . . , An.
2.2.4. PROBL(MS WITH TH( MONOTH(OR(TICAL D(DuCTIV( MOD(L. The monotheoretical deductive model reﬂects well the notion that when anomalies ﬁrst appear, their
kind is usually unknown. In this case, the model shows clearly that there is some sort
of anomaly. But it also shows that a model of falsiﬁcation provides no guide to determining which kind of anomaly has appeared: the syntax only tells us that the anomaly
is either factual or theoretical. Unlike the dogmatic model, according to which anomalies have virtually no lifespan, anomalies under the monotheoretical deductive model
seem, at least on logical grounds, unresolvable.
The monotheoretical deductive model has often shown up in the context of discussions of the Duhem-Quine thesis. The thrust of the Duhem-Quine thesis is primarily
negative and amounts to a rejection of the dogmatic model (see Duhem [1906] 1954,
185 and Quine 1951, 39-40). Both Duhem and Quine argue that the direct refutation of
a theory is impossible on the grounds that a single theory cannot be isolated. The main
diﬀerence between Duhem and Quine concerns the problem of when, if at all, a theory
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can indeed be refuted. For Duhem, bon sens is employed to determine when auxiliary
hypotheses have been adequately enumerated and veriﬁed. (Thus, for Duhem, using
bon sens could loosely be called a heuristic strategy.) Quine, in contrast, seems to believe that deﬁnitive refutation of a theory is unattainable since the auxiliary hypotheses
include claims as basic as the validity of one’s arithmetic and logic (which could always
turn out to be false). (For more on the diﬀerences between Duhem and Quine in this
regard, see Gillies [1993] 1998.)
In like manner, the ceteris paribus clause also poses a problem for the monotheoretical model. The dogmatic falsiﬁcationist seeks to ignore it, but is stuck in the
predicament of being unable to tackle many important scientiﬁc theories. But if the
theory being tested states, for example, that momentum is conserved if the system is
closed, then a statement expressing the ceteris paribus clause (e.g.,“the system is closed”
or “there are no relevant but unaccounted for factors”) stands in need of veriﬁcation.
But it is not clear how such statements could be veriﬁed, since any number of true observation statements would be logically insuﬃcient to prove a negative existential claim
of this sort.8 The consequences for anomaly are considerable: a given anomaly could
potentially survive indeﬁnitely unless the ceteris paribus premise can be established as
true.
A second problem with the monotheoretical deductive model emerges when falsiﬁcationists employ a methodology for making decisions when the model itself does
not compel rational choices. Lakatos considers the monotheoretical deductive model
typical of “naive methodological falsiﬁcationism” (Lakatos 1978, 44). The shortcoming
Some would take a statement expressing the ceteris paribus clause to be an auxiliary hypothesis.
See (Lakatos 1978, 98) for why this could be considered a “blunder.” Instead of expressing the
ceteris paribus clause as an explanatory premise, one can simply note that the number of auxiliary
hypotheses is indefinite. Noting that there could always be another, unaccounted for auxiliary
hypothesis is the same as saying that a statement expressing the ceteris paribus clause is unverifiable
in principle.
8
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of the monotheoretical deductive model is that it can still manage to isolate a single
theory. So when employed in conjunction with a methodology, the monotheoretical model converges on the dogmatic model. Consider the following methodological
schema. At the moment an anomaly appears, one proceeds to verify rigorously one’s
initial conditions. One determines the truth-value of each of the the auxiliary hypotheses, one by one, and ﬁnally one decides if the ceteris paribus clause has been satisﬁed
(see the “fourth decision” in Lakatos 1978, 26-28). If one decides that the auxiliary
hypotheses have been exhausted and are all true, then one can then refute the theory,
just as one would using the dogmatic model, that is, without a successful explanation
of the anomalous phenomenon in hand. And we end up with an implausible view of
anomaly like that of the dogmatic model. Scientists, as a community, have historically shown themselves unwilling to consider auxiliary hypotheses or a ceteris paribus
premise well-corroborated solely for the purpose of refuting an important law if there
is no successor theory available. Thus, scientists are unlikely to believe that an anomaly
is theoretical (and not factual or phenomenal) if the anomalous phenomenon has not
been successfully explained by the successor theory.
2.2.5. PLuRALISTIC D(DuCTIV( MOD(L AND SOPHISTICAT(D M(THODOLOGICAL FALSIFICATION. In this section, I will discuss two revisions to the monotheoretical deductive model oﬀered by Lakatos. The ﬁrst, which he calls the pluralistic deductive
model, incorporates a second expansion of the antecedent of the dogmatic model. It is
important to note that the methodological purpose of the pluralistic model is diﬀerent
than that of the monotheoretical model: it is used not for theory refutation, but rather
for showing how theories survive in the midst of anomalies which would seem to refute
them and for showing how theories can be progressively modiﬁed without losing their
identity. The second revision, however, does describe how explanatory theories are
refuted: the result is a model for “sophisticated methodological falsiﬁcation.”
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An anomaly may appear which, in the light of a model of falsiﬁcation, seems to
refute a theory; but the theory is neither rejected nor replaced as a result. In fact this
is usually the case: as Laudan notes, the history of science does not readily provide
examples of theories unaccompanied by anomalies; if scientists let anomalies directly
refute their theories, we would have no theories left at all (Laudan 1977, 27-28). The
example that Lakatos uses is Prout’s theory (“a research programme progressing in an
ocean of anomalies”) (Lakatos 1978, 43-45, 53-55). According to Prout’s theory, since all
elements are compounds of hydrogen, the atomic weight of any pure chemical element
is a whole number. However, according to Stas’s experiments, the atomic weight of
chlorine was 35.5. Stas’s experimental setup was scrutinized and found to be adequate.
Thus, the auxiliary hypotheses were thought to be true. Nonetheless, even though the
Proutians had their critics, the theory was kept.
According to Lakatos, this case illustrates the inadequacy of the monotheoretical
deductive model. There is not merely a single theory involved in a research programme,
but rather a plurality of theories. The plurality of theories is divided into two kinds:
explanatory and interpretative (or observational) theories. Prout’s theory is an example
of an explanatory theory. Interpretative theories, on the other hand, told chemists
the conditions under which explanatory theories applied to their experimental results.
Pure chemical elements, it was believed, were obtained through chemical separation;
only later was it realized that pure elements were obtainable through physical separation. Thus, it was the intepretative theory which was inconsistent with the explanatory
theory and the anomalous observation statement. Lakatos concludes:
In a monotheoretical model we regard the higher-level theory as an explanatory theory to be judged by the “facts” delivered from outside (by the
authoritative experimentalist): in the case of a clash we reject the explanation. In a pluralistic model we may decide, alternatively, to regard the
higher-level theory as an interpretative theory to judge the “facts” delivered
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from outside: in case of a clash we may reject the “facts” as “monsters.”
In a pluralistic model of testing, several theories—more or less deductively
organized—are soldered together. … It is not that we propose a theory and
Nature may shout NO; rather, we propose a maze of theories, and Nature
may shout INCONSIST(NT. (Lakatos 1978, 45)
Lakatos’ revision to the monotheoretical deductive model conjoins an unspeciﬁed
number of interpretative theories TI1 , . . . , TIn to the antecedent (which already includes auxiliary hypotheses and the explanatory theory TE ). The following model is
the result:
1

(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An ∧ TE ∧ TI1 ∧ · · · ∧ TIn ) → O

2

¬O

3

¬(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An ∧ TE ∧ TI1 ∧ · · · ∧ TIn )

(Pluralistic deductive model)

It’s worth reiterating that the pluralistic deductive model is not suited for refutation
of the explanatory theory. At this point, the farthest that theory falsiﬁcation can
proceed down a path towards refutation is to say that there is an inconsistency in
the theory group, once methodological decisions are made which state that the truth
conditions for the auxiliary hypotheses and for any ceteris paribus premise have been
met. From there, the methodology typically calls for altering one of the interpretative
theories to restore consistency in the theory group. Interpretative theories, unlike
auxiliary hypotheses, cannot merge with an unproblematic background. It is for this
reason, and not on syntactic grounds, that the pluralistic model cannot converge on a
monotheoretical model.
For falsiﬁcation of an explanatory theory to take place, a successor theory must
be in hand. This is the second condition for “sophisticated methodological falsiﬁcation.” A successor theory has the explanatory power of the theory it replaces, and
can, in addition, explain some outstanding anomalies. Laws of Newtonian mechanics
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are subject to falsiﬁcation by an anomaly only after relativistic mechanics explains all
of the phenomena explained by Newtonian mechanics, and moreover, explains the refuting anomaly (namely, the perihelion advance of Mercury). Of course, there could
be anomalies under a theory which are not explained by the successor theory; but we
could not say of these anomalies that they refute the theory. Moreover, if the successor
theory does not explain an anomaly, then it remains unknown which kind of anomaly
it is.
A model for “sophisticated methodological falsiﬁcation” would include the successor theory to explanatory theory T. Furthermore, the successor theory T 0 must be
consistent with the anomaly Oanomaly,Ā,T¯I ,TE .
1

(T → O) ↔ T 0

2

¬O

3

T0

4

T →O

5

¬T

(“Sophisticated falsiﬁcation”)

An anomaly, under the pluralistic deductive model (using sophisticated falsiﬁcation),
is the true negation of an observation statement O such that (A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An ∧ TE ∧
TI1 ∧ · · · ∧ TIn ) and ¬O form an inconsistent set of statements. We stipulate ﬁrst
that a theoretical anomaly is an inconsistency in the conjunction of Oanomaly,Ā,T¯I ,TE and
the theory group TE , TI1 , . . . , TIn. Secondly, an anomaly caused by a false explanatory
theory statement is the true negation of an observation statement O such that T and
¬O are inconsistent while the successor theory T 0 and ¬O are consistent.
2.2.6. SOM( SOLuTIONS FROM TH( PLuRALISTIC D(DuCTIV( MOD(L (USING SOPHISTICAT(D FALSIFICATION). Many of the gains made by the pluralistic deductive model
over the monotheoretical deductive model are heuristically useful. First, from the
claim that explanatory theories cannot be refuted unless a successor theory is available,
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it follows that the anomaly kind of an anomaly caused by false explanatory theories cannot be known prior to the successful explanation of that anomaly. Heuristic methods
should take this epistemic limit about anomaly kinds into consideration. But neither
the dogmatic nor the monotheoretical deductive model acknowledge this limit.
Second, theoretical anomalies can be approached with a new strategy. One can treat
an anomaly as a “monster” and set about examining and adjusting one’s interpretative
theories so that one’s theory group is consistent. Several kinds of discoveries can result
from scrutiny of one’s interpretative theories: tacit interpretative theories are made
explicit (e.g., that certain puriﬁcation techniques yield pure samples); experimental
procedures are questioned or improved (e.g., new puriﬁcation techniques are adopted);
the meanings of theoretical terms are redeﬁned (e.g., that a “pure” sample need not
result from chemical separation).9
Third, anomaly resolution no longer needs to be concerned with fulﬁlling truthconditions for statements expressing the ceteris paribus clause. Without a methodological decision, anomaly resolution would never ﬁnish insofar as statements expressing the ceteris paribus clause would be negative existential claims. But such premises
are redundant within sophisticated falsiﬁcation (Lakatos 1978, 98): having a successor
theory in hand is suﬃcient condition for the refutation of an explanatory theory.
Ending my account of the linguistic view here, I do not presume in any way that
the pluralistic deductive model and sophisticated methodological falsiﬁcation do not
have problems of their own. Nor do I suppose that a stronger version of a linguistic
view of anomaly could not be elaborated. My goal here has been simply to present a
minimally compelling linguistic view; by which I mean, reasonably coherent as well as
relevant to actual scientiﬁc practice. Furthermore, I have tried to clarify what is meant
For a more recent account of heuristic strategies concerning “monster-barring” and anomalybased theory revision, see Darden 1990, passim, and 1991, 269-274.
9
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when anomalies are called “inconsistencies”; as the linguistic view develops, it should
become even clearer.
2.3. H(uRISTIC UTILITY OF LINGuISTIC VI(W IN D(T(RMINING IF TH(R( IS AN
ANOMALY IN EXPLANATION
To the extent that a model of explanation fails to distinguish explanations from nonexplanations, the view of anomaly based on that model will also fail to separate anomalies in explanation from non-explanatory anomalies or non-anomalies. The standard
counterexamples to the D-N model typically invoke instances of non-explanations
which ﬁt all the deﬁnitional requirements of the D-N model (Salmon 1989, 46-50). For
example, one could conceive of a law whereby if the barometer gives a reading below a
certain pressure, then a storm will occur. Such a law in conjunction with a statement
signifying a suﬃcient drop in barometric pressure fulﬁll the requirements for an explanans under the D-N model, provided that a storm does indeed occur. Nevertheless,
it is counterintuitive to say that a barometer reading and a law linking barometer readings to storm activity explain a storm. We expect an explanation to respect causality:
the explanans should express the cause of the explanandum-phenomenon. In this case,
the storm and the barometer reading have common atmospheric causes, but the latter
does not regularly cause the other (Salmon 1989, 47).
The D-N model has been confronted with many other counterexamples which
show it to be indiscriminate: a set of laws and facts could meet the requirements to be
an explanans and yet fail to refer to one. The D-N model transmits this problem to the
linguistic view of anomaly. Imagine that the storm was an anomalous explanandumphenomenon. We would like to resolve the anomaly, and our heuristics would probably
involve probing and revising the laws and the relevant facts that together should explain
the explanandum-phenomenon (but do not). But it would be pointless to consider
revising the “barometer” law above, because it never contributed to a satisfactory ex26

planans. Yet the D-N model left the door open to it. Just as the D-N model can
accommodate non-explanations, the linguistic view has the potential to distract the
resolution of anomalies by mistaking non-explanatory anomalies for anomalies in explanation.
Another set of diﬃculties for the D-N model concern legitimate types of scientiﬁc
explanation which do not ﬁt. Functional analysis is a well-known example (for details,
see Salmon (1989, 26-32)). The D-N model often does not accommodate mechanistic
explanation (this limitation will be examined in §§ 4.2). Thus, anomalies involving
mechanistically-produced phenomena therefore may not be expressible in nomological
terms, and therefore may not be detected by the linguistic view.
A third limitation of the linguistic view is that anomalies do not become apparent
except as logical inconsistencies.10 This means that any anomaly presupposes that the
theoretical, factual, and phenomenal content has been adequately expressed in statements. Only then can they be placed in a deductive structure and a logical inconsistency arise. The language requirement could be questioned in two ways, linguistically
and cognitively. First, it could be argued that scientiﬁc theories and phenomena are
resistant to being adequately articulated in language. Second, there is the cognitive
issue concerning how actual scientists recognize and deal with anomalies. It could be
argued that anomalies are recognized by scientists prior to such articulation (see § 3).
Defining anomaly in terms of logical consistency is not merely a convenient way of looking at
things. That science must proceed from a logically consistent foundation has been a widely held
belief in 20th c. philosophy of science. Consider Lakatos’ critique of Bohr for his willingness to leave
anomalies unresolved in early quantum mechanics:
10

But consistency—in a strong sense of the term [Two propositions are inconsistent if
their conjunction has no model, that is, there is no interpretation of their descriptive
terms in which the conjunction is true. (note in original)]—must remain an important
regulative principle (over and above the requirement of progressive problemshift); and
inconsistencies (including anomalies) must be seen as problems. The reason is simple.
If science aims at truth, it must aim at consistency; if it resigns consistency, it resigns
truth. (Lakatos 1978, 57-58)
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Moreover, scientists may be able to resolve anomalies without complete articulation
of the anomaly in language. This last point will be discussed in § 4.4.
The linguistic view also has a certain advantage related to the limitation imposed
by the language requirement. An anomaly may very well be recognized prior to its
linguistic articulation, but it may also escape the notice of many in the scientiﬁc community; but if one succeeds in expressing an anomaly as a logical inconsistency, then
it is highly perspicuous to anyone with a grasp of rudimentary logic. Herein lies the
primary heuristic utility of the linguistic view. The linguistic view, even if it falls short
of providing an adequate account of anomaly, could provide eﬀective tools for communication and thereby enable the scientiﬁc community at large to discover that there is
an anomaly.
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§ 3. TH( P(RC(PTuAL VI(W OF ANOMALY
During the historicist turn in the philosophy of science, many involved in science
studies began to look at anomalies from the perspective of how they actually appear
to historically-situated scientists. The perceptual view of anomaly diﬀers from the
linguistic view in that anomaly refers not to a class of observation statements but to
a category of phenomena. Those who maintain the perceptual view need not deny
that anomalies can be expressed as true observation statements giving rise to logical
inconsistency within a deductive model. They simply deny that this is all that an
anomaly is. Anomalies are at ﬁrst perceived before they are expressed (if they are
expressed) linguistically. Thus, the phenomenon to which Oanomaly,S refers is always
already anomalous.
The most well-known exposition of the perceptual view of anomaly is found in
the writings of Thomas Kuhn. Below, I will reconstruct the perceptual view based on
Kuhn’s, Hanson’s, and post-Kuhnian philosophy of science. But I would like to caution
the reader: endorsing a perceptual view of anomaly does not require acceptance of
Kuhn’s account of scientiﬁc change (e.g., paradigm shifts, incommensurability, and so
on). I’ll refer to the explanatory model on which the perceptual view is based as
“explanation during normal science.” This is merely for the sake of economy. As
should become clear, one can adopt this explanatory model without committing to
Kuhn’s conception of normal science as a stage in the historical development of a
scientiﬁc discipline.
3.1. EXPLANATORY SuCC(SS: NORMAL SCI(NC(
The road to successful explanation for normal science diﬀers from that for D-N explanation and Popperian falsiﬁcation. D-N explanation begins with a phenomenon
in need of explanation; the phenomenon is expressed by an explanandum-statement
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which is assumed to be true; one or several potential explanantia are formulated; and
then, according to the hypothetico-deductive method, potential explanantia are rejected until one remains which appears conﬁrmed. Theory falsiﬁcation runs roughly
parallel: it begins with a conjecture which has both explanatory power and circumscribes the phenomena which it would fail to explain, should they appear; an indeﬁnite
theory-testing phase follows; should the conjecture survive a certain period of time, it
may be accepted as corroborated.
Explanation in normal science begins with a theory—a paradigm—which is assumed to be true (a “disciplinary matrix”) and which is also present as a prototype
of successful explanation (an “exemplar”); it continues with the search for another
phenomenon which could potentially be explained under the paradigm (an unsolved
“problem” belonging to the paradigm); a successful explanation is arrived at when such
a phenomenon is found and is ﬁt into one of the explanatory patterns of the paradigm
(i.e., resembles one of the exemplary “problem-solutions”) (Kuhn [1962] 1996, 174-175).
In linguistic models of the explanatory process, a set of phenomena, expressible in
true observation statements, are given at the outset, whereas theories may or may not
be compatible with them. The activity of inventing theories to explain phenomena
seems to be autonomous of the phenomena. Even for those like Popper and Lakatos,
who reject theory justiﬁcation, discovery remains mysterious; indeed, for them, it is
even more causally disconnected from the regularities of natural phenomena than it
was for the positivists. “Science does not rest on rock-bottom,” Popper is famous
for saying, “the bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp” ([1934]
1961, 111). In the same vein, Lakatos writes (with a touch of romanticism) that “the
direction of science is determined primarily by human creative imagination and not by
the universe of facts which surrounds us” (1978, 99).
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In contrast, in normal science, it is given that a theory, or paradigm, has been
fully accepted; it is rather the phenomena to which they potentially apply which begin
partially undetermined. Moreover, paradigms are not causally disconnected from the
phenomena appearing under them. A paradigm presents unsolved problems to scientists working under it. As a disciplinary matrix, a paradigm includes all the pedagogical
means, linguistic and non-linguistic, needed to train scientists to solve outstanding
problems. This training includes teaching scientists how to experience natural phenomena to which, untrained, they would have previously been insensible. For example,
the paradigm of Newtonian mechanics is more than just a set of equations and laws;
it also directs students through hands-on experimental situations so that they learn
to recognize the phenomena referred to as mass, force, and acceleration. Change in
paradigm entails change in the phenomenal world inhabited by the scientists.11 Thus,
without the paradigm, the phenomena to be explained would not even appear to them.
In §§ 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, I will present two approaches to interpreting this provocative
claim.
3.1.1. A KANTIAN INT(RPR(TATION. Kuhn’s philosophy of science bears more than a
passing resemblance to Kant’s. Kuhn holds that the objects of perception with which
a scientist is concerned are constituted by the paradigm. The constitutive role of the
paradigm is similar then to that of a priori forms of experience (pure intuitions) such as
Euclidean space. Unlike Kant, however, Kuhn held that that which constitutes (from
the side of the subject) the scientists’ phenomenal world changes; thus, the apriority of
the paradigm does not entail invariance. Many have criticized Kuhn for the “pluralityof-phenomenal-worlds thesis,”12 since it would seem to entail a relativism which would
“Paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement diﬀerently.
In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say
that after a revolution scientists are responding to a diﬀerent world” (Kuhn [1962] 1996, 111).
12
Hoyningen-Huene (See 1993, 36ﬀ.).
11
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undermine any account of scientiﬁc rationality. Whether rationality is sacriﬁced when
aﬃrming the thesis has been debatable. There is however a deeper problem plaguing
Kuhn’s Kantian metaphysics which is directly relevant to his account of anomaly.
The paradigm is the subject-sided factor constituting the phenomenal world; but
what is the object-sided constitutive factor? For Kuhn, there must be some factor
co-constituting phenomenal worlds other than paradigms, something which would remain unchanged by a paradigm shift or which would support multiple synchronous
paradigms. This is made particularly evident by that fact that paradigms are not
forcibly tied down to a particular historical moment; individuals living at the same
time can work within diﬀerent paradigms. This is almost certain to happen immediately after a major theory change: Newtonians remained in the midst of those working
under the new paradigm of relativistic physics. Another example might be folk science:
it seems that most of us, prior to any training in modern physics, inhabit a paradigm
of vaguely Aristotelian conceptions of motion.
Moreover, what would the relation of a scientist to this world external to phenomena amount to? If empirical knowledge of a world independent of scientiﬁc paradigms
should be possible, then scientists would have the means to judge which paradigm
corresponds best to the external world. On the other hand, if access to it were not
possible, knowledge about it might be obtained by inference from the diﬀerences between successive paradigms. Kuhn rejects both sorts of realism: ﬁrst, because the
paradigm is the condition of possibility of scientiﬁc experience, which is to say, a scientist cannot step outside of her paradigm, unless into another one; second, Kuhn’s
account of scientiﬁc progress and rationality does not depend on the convergence of
paradigms on a true description of an external world, and he explicitly denies that the
latter takes place (Kuhn [1962] 1996, 160-161). Kuhn is left, despite himself, with having
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tacitly to adopt a concept of a world-in-itself, forever inaccessible to scientiﬁc inquiry,
which strongly resembles the Kantian things-in-themselves.13
And ﬁnally, the clearest indication that phenomena are co-constituted by an external world to which scientists have no access is the existence of anomaly itself. As
Hoyningen-Huene remarks—
The repeated occurrence of signiﬁcant anomalies in the history of science
can, in fact, prove one motive for assuming the existence of a theoryindependent, and by its own determinate, proprietary features resistant,
world-in-itself. (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 227)
Interpreting Kuhn in light of Carnap, and Carnap in light of Neokantianism has
reasonable support in the history of the philosophy of science (see Friedman 2001,
41-44; Boyd 1984, 56; Friedman 1999). However, no sooner does Kuhn say something
with idealist overtones such as “when paradigms change, the world itself changes with
them” ([1962] 1996, 111), than he begins discussing the latest psychological theories of
perception as would a naturalist. Hence, it’s also possible to consider explanation under
normal science from a cognitive perspective, and leave aside the diﬃcult metaphysical
commitments entailed by the Kantian perspective.14
3.1.2. A G(STALTIST INT(RPR(TATION. Unlike the explananda-phenomena of D-N
explanations which are simply given, a phenomenon to be explained during normal
13

Hoyningen-Huene comments on Kuhn’s position in 1979:
Kuhn now explicitly does without the world-in-itself, the “one real world, still unknown.” He describes his position as “also Kantian, but without the ‘things-inthemselves”’ (and with temporally mutable categories). Though Kuhn claims his position to be a “realistic” one, the precise meaning of this claim remains, admittedly,
unexplained (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 60).

14

Ron Giere makes a similar comment:
Kuhn’s oﬃcial theory is the stage theory. But in fact, I think what he is groping toward
is a cognitive theory. He picked Gestalt psychology because that was the best thing
around in the late 1950s. (Callebaut 1993, 352)
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science ﬁrst needs to be constituted. Adapting a thesis articulated by Hanson, Kuhn
describes this constitution process in terms of gestalt-switching. Consider an isometric
line drawing of a cube (i.e., a Necker cube). Gathering the same information from the
same visual ﬁeld, one can perceive several distinctly diﬀerent forms: a transparent cube
as seen from below, a transparent cube as seen from above, a solid irregular polyhedron
resembling a well-cut diamond, and so on (Hanson 1969, 86-87). Thus a single concrete
drawing seems to have the potential to produce multiple phenomena in our perception.
But that in virtue of which one of those phenomena is actualized and in virtue of which
we see an actual geometrical shape is the paradigm. Hanson claims that learning to
see as a scientist does is a similar process: a simple drawing of a cathode-ray tube
may be meaningless to the non-physicist, but to the physicist would be immediately
recognizable.
Moreover, not only do the same stimuli have the potential to produce diﬀerent
phenomena, but diﬀerent stimuli have the the potential to produce the same phenomena. To exemplify this point, Kuhn refers to Stratton’s experiments on the inversion
of the retinal image. Test subjects were outﬁtted with inverting goggles over an extended period of time. Initially, their visual ﬁeld appeared upside-down to them, and
they experienced disorientation. In a matter of days, however, they had compensated
such that they no longer perceived the inversion (Kuhn [1962] 1996, 112). Likewise, a
scientist will see the same phenomena appear when immersed in diﬀerent stimuli. Her
ability to do so is conditioned by the paradigm in which she is operating.
The diﬃculty with accounting for the initial stages of the explanatory process in
terms of gestalt experiments is that the cognitive processes studied in those experiments and those involved in scientiﬁc explanation may not be the same. Kuhn recognized this diﬃculty explicitly (Kuhn [1962] 1996, 113-114). However, the analogy
between the experiments and his readings of the history of science proved provocative
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enough for him to stretch the concept of gestalt enough to accommodate his views on
scientiﬁc explanation.
Whenever a phenomenon to be explained is psychologically constituted under normal science, the subsequent explanatory process is somewhat less onerous than what it
would be if, say, the hypothetico-deductive method were being pursued. The explanatory theory, after all, is assumed to be true. Moreover, because of the constitutive role
of the paradigm, the phenomenon to be explained is, in a sense, already explicable,
if not already partially explained. Scientiﬁc explanation as “puzzle-solving” should be
taken quite literally in this context: the scientist is taught a pattern—the gestalt—
ahead of time and the pieces—the phenomena—are laid out before her. She proceeds
then to arrange the phenomena into the gestalt—to recognize how they ﬁt the pattern–and thereby procures a successful explanation. Pieces, however, frequently do not
ﬁt.
3.2. ANOMALY uND(R NORMAL SCI(NTIFIC EXPLANATION
An anomaly, under normal scientiﬁc explanation, is a perceptual event which fails to
be adequately represented under the reigning theories (which nevertheless contribute
in some sense to the possibility of the event). Philosophers of science have conceived
of the nature of this contribution in several ways: metaphysically, as a priori conditions of possibility for the appearance of phenomena to scientists; linguistically, as a
priori conditions—presuppositions—necessary for terms in scientiﬁc language to refer
(Friedman 2001, 74); and cognitively, as psychologically-conceived sets of expectations
which are subject to empirical study.
I would like to leave aside the aprioristic conceptions of anomaly if only because
the Kantian metaphysics are highly problematic and the linguistic understanding in
fact reveals nothing about the actual perception of anomalies. Instead, I would like
to focus on the cognitive conception. Kuhn, at one point, deﬁnes anomaly as an
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experience diﬃcult to put into words, “a phenomenon, that is, for which his paradigm
had not readied the investigator” ([1962] 1996, 57). In his discussion of the Bruner and
Postman playing card experiment, Kuhn refers to the irregular cards as “anomalous,
e.g., a red six of spades and a black four of hearts” ([1962] 1996, 63). When the anomaly
ﬁrst appeared, the perceiver could only say “that something had gone wrong” ([1962]
1996, 57). Anomaly is, however, “the prelude to discovery” ([1962] 1996, 57). Once
the anomaly is understood—for example, once a test subject identiﬁes that there are
anomalous playing cards and what they are—then “the initially anomalous becomes the
anticipated,” and “at this point, the discovery has been completed” ([1962] 1996, 64).
The question if there is an anomaly is answered when it is perceived that something
is wrong. 15 The perceiver’s set of expectations has been upset by a phenomenon, but
the perceiver need not be able to describe how her expectations have been contravened
nor even how the phenomenon appears. By the time the perceiver is able to articulate
the nature of the anomaly, the anomaly has been resolved. Since the description of the
anomalous phenomenon merges into the set of expectations, one could say that it has,
at that point, been successfully explained.
It is important to note that the appearance of anomaly rides entirely on the competence of the perceivers. During the playing card experiment, there were test subjects
who never resolved the anomaly: that is, they could never revise their theory that a
deck of cards contains only black spades and clubs, red hearts and diamonds. Curiously, such perceivers seem to lose basic observational competence altogether, which
seems to imply that they in fact do perceive the anomaly, but they cannot recognize it
since they cannot revise their theory. Kuhn recounts:
The moment when this answer is given marks “the beginning of an episode of discovery,” a
requisite of which is “the individual skill, wit, or genius to recognize that something has gone wrong
in ways that may prove consequential” (1977, 173).
15
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A few subjects, however, were never able to make the requisite adjustment
of their categories. …One of them exclaimed: “I can’t make the suit out,
whatever it is. It didn’t even look like a card that time. I don’t know what
color it is now or whether it’s a spade or a heart. I’m not even sure what a
spade looks like. My God!” (Kuhn [1962] 1996, 63-64)
3.3. H(uRISTIC UTILITY OF P(RC(PTuAL VI(W IN D(T(RMINING IF TH(R( IS AN
ANOMALY IN EXPLANATION
One problem for the linguistic view is that the explanatory models on which it is
based falls short of providing the suﬃcient conditions for a scientiﬁc explanation. Because those explanatory models have trouble distinguishing between explanations and
non-explanations, the linguistic view inherits this trouble when distinguishing between
anomalies in explanation and non-explanatory anomalies. It’s not clear that the perceptual view fares better. On the one hand, successful explanation is guaranteed by
the paradigm. There’s no risk of explaining the height of a ﬂagpole by the length of
its shadow since the exemplary problem-solutions of the paradigm do not include such
“explanations.” On the other, it’s not clear why a paradigm would not include such
“explanations,” provided they were accepted as legitimate. For example, the necessary
conditions for successful explanation may vary according to paradigm. Kepler’s laws as
Kepler formulated them lack explanatory power under Newtonian physics since they
provide only a geometrical, not a dynamical, description of orbital motion. (Einstein
makes a similar claim vis-à-vis Newton’s gravitational laws.) Therefore, the heuristic
utility of the perceptual view is limited insofar as it could allow for a non-explanatory
anomaly to be mistaken for an anomaly in explanation.
Regarding inclusiveness of explanatory types, the perceptual view is useful, as it
does not have the limitations of the linguistic view. Any type of explanation which has
been practiced in the history of science can give rise to anomalies in explanation. The
only limiting factor would be the explanatory forms practiced under the paradigm in
which one is operating.
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The perceptual view also seems less likely to miss certain anomalies on account of
their not appearing as logical inconsistencies. The perceptual view has no language
requirement. Scientists ﬁrst perceive anomalies qua anomalies and then can express
them linguistically. However, there is an issue concerning whether or not the cognitive
constraint might also be restrictive. Need a scientist recognize that a phenomena fails
to ﬁt into a paradigmatic gestalt in order to say if there is an anomaly? In a sense, the
linguistic view might seem less restrictive than the perceptual view: a minimal competence in logic would allow someone to say that there is an anomaly (provided, of course,
that the necessary theoretical and observation statements have been articulated). This
is not to say that some form of a cognitive constraint should not be accepted. Only that
any such constraint should allow for the possibility that a scientist may be convinced
that there is an anomaly by force of logic in situations where he has diﬃculty perceiving it. A scientist’s belief that there is an anomaly on logical grounds16 might further
be coupled with a sort of blindsight: he may in fact be able to respond to anomalies
without consciously perceiving them.

16

In addition, other forms of external representation may be employed besides language (see 4.4).
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§ 4.

TH( M(CHANISTIC VI(W OF ANOMALY
4.1. EXAMPL(: PuPILLARY R(FL(X

To begin the discussion of the mechanistic view, I would like to give an example of a
mechanistic explanation. Suppose one sets out to explain the pupillary reﬂex of the
human eye. One might correlate the constriction of the pupil with the intensity of the
light passing through it. One could further note that when only one eye is exposed
to light, the pupil of the unexposed eye nevertheless constricts (consensual response).
Moreover, one could regiment the correlation in a formal language and test it using a
falsiﬁcation model.
Still, intuitively, one might think that there is something lacking in this explanation. It may appear that we have done no more than specify more precisely which
phenomenon needs to be explained. When we set out to explain the pupillary reﬂex,
we are also interested in how the pupils constrict when light passes through one or both
of them. In other words, how are pupillary reﬂexes produced?
To answer this question, one would attempt to isolate the mechanism responsible
for causing the phenomenon in need of explanation. When light enters the pupil at
time tn , a constriction of the pupil occurs at a later time tn+1. Hence, one would
specify the sequence of operations which take place in the mechanism between tn and
tn+1 : the transduction of a light signal into a electro-chemical signal; the relaying of the
electro-chemical signal towards both pupils; the processing of the signal for determining
if the pupil is to constrict; the innervation of the muscles which constrict the pupil;
and the observed constriction of the pupil. Furthermore, one would specify the parts
of the mechanism which carry out these operations. From this perspective, one is
looking primarily at spatial rather than temporal arrangement. One would construct
a neuroanatomical map (see ﬁgure 1), beginning at the location where light enters the
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pupil and strikes the retina, and ending where the pupils constrict: the retinal ganglion ce's involved in pupillary reﬂexes project to the pretectum in the midbrain; the
pretectal cells project bilaterally to both accessory oculomotor nuclei; from accessory oculomotor nucleus, preganglionic parasympathetic neurons project to the ciliary ganglion;
and postganglionic parasympathetic neurons project from the ciliary ganglion to the pupillary sphincter.

Figure 1: Diagram of pupillary reflex (Kandel et al. 2000, 528).

A ﬁner-grained explanation, or one emphasizing particular features of the mechanism, can be made according to the level and character of explanation which is elicited
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by the description of the phenomenon to be explained. For example, the explanation
above would be serviceable for a clinician using pupillary reﬂexes to diagnose damage to
the optic nerve, oculomotor nerve, or to the midbrain: a consensual pupillary response
(i.e., from the eye not exposed to light) with no direct pupillary response (i.e., from the
eye exposed to light) would indicate damage to the oculomotor nerve; bilateral pupillary response when one eye is exposed to light, but no response when the other eye is
exposed would indicate damage to the optic nerve; complete lack of pupillary response
may indicate damage to the midbrain, or damage to both optic nerves (Kandel et al.
2000, 528). However, the above explanation would need to be developed signiﬁcantly
if one were interested in explaining a particular feature, such as response time of the
pupillary reﬂex.
4.2. EXPLANATORY SuCC(SS: M(CHANISTIC EXPLANATION
4.2.1. M(CHANISTIC MOD(LS. The mechanistic model aims to generalize scientiﬁc
explanations in terms of the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon in need of explanation. In the above example, the phenomenon of pupillary reﬂex is explained in
terms of the neuroanatomical parts and the orchestrated interactions of these parts
within the reﬂex mechanism. The explanatory process consists of creating a model of
the mechanism. A schematic model is derived from the phenomenon to be explained:
light passing through the pupil is a set-up condition and pupillary constriction is a result.17 From there, the model goes through a process of decomposition: from set-up
conditions to phenomenon to be explained, there are a number of mediating parts and
activities to be discovered.
A mechanistic explanation includes a description of the spatial relations between
the parts of a mechanism as well as a description of the temporal relations between
Although this mechanistic explanation of a pupillary reflex describes a linear process, mechanisms and their models are often non-linear. (Indeed, so is the pupillary reflex at a lower-level.) I
have chosen a linear process for the sake of simplicity.
17
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the interactions of these parts (Craver 2002, 387-388). In a mechanistic model, one
aims to couple a description of a spatial relation (e.g., contiguity) between parts with a
description of a temporal relation (e.g., succession) between the interactions of those
parts. Above, a typical spatial relation is neuronal projection: e.g., the ciliary ganglion
projects to the pupillary sphincter. A temporal relation between the interactions of
these parts is also described: e.g., the preganglionic parasympathetic neurons synapse
at the ciliary ganglion with the postganglionic parasympathetic neurons, which in turn
innervate the pupillary sphincter. The coupling of descriptions of interactions with
descriptions of parts of a mechanism is commonly called localization. Localization
often involves some type of interﬁeld integration: in this case, neuroanatomists deﬁne
the parts and their layout while the electrophysiologists deﬁne the interactions and
their sequence (Craver 2002, 388).
Accounts of mechanistic models of explanation come in several diﬀerent metaphysical ﬂavors, as can be seen from the labels mechanists give to complementary elements
of a mechanism: let’s assume we are referring to (1) a retinal receptor cell and (2)
transduction. I have been referring to (1) as a part and (2) as an interaction. Bechtel,
Richardson, and Abrahamsen would call both (1) and (2) a component which has two
aspects: (1) is a component part and (2) is a component function or operation (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, 423-424). In a dualistic vein,
Machamer, Darden, and Craver would prefer calling (1) an entity and (2) an activity
in order to emphasize the productive, processual character of (2) and the substantial,
property-bearing character of (1) (2000, 3). Woodward and Glennan would call (2) an
“invariant, change-relating generalization” to capture the notion that interactions are
causally induced property-changes whose occurrence is law-like (Woodward 2002, S375;
Glennan 2002, S344). As far as the overall functioning of a mechanism is concerned,
Machamer, Darden, and Craver refer to organization, while Bechtel and Abrahamsen
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refer, more lyrically, to orchestration. As Glennan remarks, all of these authors would
consider a mechanism a complex system (2002, S344); this is worth noting because
although mechanists refer in their models of explanation to “set-up conditions” and
“termination conditions,” mechanisms often consist of and participate in non-linear
arrangements.
At this point, these diﬀerences in mechanistic metaphysics do not seem to me to
be signiﬁcant for the mechanistic view of anomaly. In this thesis, I use “parts” and
“interactions” only because the terms have been in use for decades (Wimsatt [1976]
1984, 492-493) and I am not here trying to express my preferences in this dialogue. I
think that other metaphysical conceptions of mechanism would substitute painlessly
throughout this discussion.
4.2.2. M(CHANISTIC V. NOMOLOGICAL EXPLANATION; LAWS IN M(CHANISMS. As
noted in § 1, many are interested in mechanistic explanation these days because mechanisms are discovered in the biosciences far more readily than laws. This fact certainly
makes mechanistic explanation relevant to philosophers of science and suﬃces to motivate those taking a naturalistic approach to their discipline (Darden and Craver 2005,
240-241). Nonetheless, there is more at stake for the proponents of mechanistic explanation than whether scientists in a certain discipline aim to discover mechanisms
or laws. There is the question of whether certain nomological explanations can be
replaced with mechanistic explanations, and vice-versa. On the one hand, several
mechanists have, in recent years, developed their accounts of explanation in accordance with the physical sciences (which tend to explain phenomena in terms of laws):
notably, Salmon (1984), Woodward (2002), and Glennan (2002). Unlike Galilean or
Cartesian mechanistic philosophy, these accounts have been developed in light of
mechanistically inexplicable phenomena in modern physics such as gravitation and
electromagnetic ﬁelds. On the other hand, philosophy of biology has also seen eﬀorts
43

to redescribe mechanisms in terms of nomological concepts (Schaﬀner 1993). Thus,
there is a signiﬁcant tension between the two models of explanation, which is especially visible in relatively new disciplines, such as cognitive science, where explanatory
norms are still in the early stages of development. This tension has lead certain philosophers to propose mechanistic explanation as an alternative to nomological explanation
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). I will discuss the question of mechanistic or nomological explanation again in § 4.4, as it is directly relevant to the heuristics of anomaly
detection.
While mechanistic and nomological models of explanation may be in competition,
laws and mechanisms can and do work together. As Bechtel and Abrahamsen note,
promoting a mechanistic model of explanation does not preclude incorporating laws
into one’s models of mechanisms:
We leave laws in place as statements of particularly robust and general
phenomena. However, we suggest that explanation is to be found in the
mechanisms that account for these laws, not in the laws themselves. (In
certain cases, laws may also be incorporated into the descriptions of parts
of a mechanism.) (2005, 422)
Laws governing gravitational, electrical or magnetic behavior, for example, may describe the interactions between parts of a mechanism. One could say that a mechanistic model “bottoms out” when the interactions of its parts are determined completely
by non-causal laws (for a discussion of “bottoming out”, see Machamer et al. 2000, 4,
13-14; on non-causal laws in mechanisms, see Glennan 2002, S348). I will return to this
discussion when I consider how the presence of laws in mechanistic models aﬀects the
resolution of anomalies caused by those models in § 6.
4.3. ANOMALY uND(R M(CHANISTIC EXPLANATION
An anomaly, under mechanistic explanation, appears when a hypothesized model of
a mechanism fails in a prediction. The anomaly is the phenomenon which directly
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reveals that the prediction has failed; it is henceforth this phenomenon which stands
in need of explanation.
Phenomenal anomalies occur when the anomalous phenomenon in fact does not
exist; they are resolved when it is known that the predictive failure which lead one to
conclude that there was an anomaly was based on unreliable data or the misinterpretation of data. Factual anomalies occur when the set-up conditions are not accurately
speciﬁed or external factors aﬀecting the mechanism are not adequately accounted
for; otherwise, if they were, the hypothesized model would succeed in the prediction.
Theoretical anomalies occur when the model of the mechanism requires revision or
rejection before it can explain the anomalous phenomenon.
4.4. H(uRISTIC UTILITY OF M(CHANISTIC VI(W IN D(T(RMINING IF TH(R( IS AN
ANOMALY IN EXPLANATION
A disadvantage of both linguistic and perceptual views of anomaly is their ineﬀectiveness in discovering whether or not an anomaly is explanatory. The mechanistic view
is more eﬀective in this respect. Consider two famous counterexamples to D-N explanation: the barometer example, cited in § 2.3, and Bromberger’s ﬂagpole example
(Salmon 1989, 47). To construct a mechanistic model of a storm wherein a barometer reading had explanatory signiﬁcance, the barometer would have to constitute a
component of the mechanism underlying the storm phenomenon. It is not physically
impossible that a barometer plays a causal a role in a particular storm. However, that a
barometer indicates that a storm is brewing does not entail that that barometer plays
a causal role in that storm or is a component in the mechanism producing that storm.
Bromberger’s ﬂagpole example makes it clear that it is possible to swap a statement expressing a particular fact in the explanans of a D-N explanation with the
explanandum-statement without resulting in a deductively invalid inference. Thus,
the height of a ﬂagpole may explain the length of the shadow it casts under the D-N
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model, but so might the length of the shadow “explain” the height of the ﬂagpole. But
mechanistic explanation would have no diﬃculty distinguishing the explanation from
the non-explanation. It seems practically inconceivable that a ﬂagpole’s cast shadow
would be a component in producing the ﬂagpole (with its properties); but it would
be relatively straightforward to describe all the components of the mechanism, which
would of course include the ﬂagpole, which produce the cast shadow.
These counterintuitive “explanations” do not pose a problem for the perceptual
view insofar as successful explanation is deﬁned according to paradigmatic gestalts or
sets of expectations and there does not seem to be any scientiﬁc community which
would have considered these “explanations” successful. Nonetheless, the perceptual
view does not give an account concerning why there has not been. Furthermore,
scientiﬁc communities are known to have accepted non-explanations as explanations:
for example, among ancient Greek astronomers, geometrical “explanations” with no
known physical signiﬁcance were common. (In fact, the ﬂagpole “explanation” has all
the virtues and vices of a geometrical “explanation” of the motion of a heavenly body.)
And, as we discussed in § 3.3, what counts as a successful explanation under one theory
often is in need of explanation under the successor theory: for example, Kepler’s laws
lost explanatory power under Newtonian mechanics and indeed were themselves in
need of explanation (whence Newton’s reformulation of them).
Thus, the mechanistic view also appears less likely than the perceptual view to
confuse a non-explanatory anomaly with an anomaly in explanation. An analogy with
the Kepler’s laws and Newtonian reformulation of them can be found in the example
mechanistic explanation above. One could formulate a law correlating light inﬂux to
pupillary constriction; but it is precisely such a “law” which would stand in need of explanation from a mechanistic point of view. Kepler speciﬁed no underlying mechanism
for the elliptical paths of planetary orbital motion. Newton’s dynamical explanation
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can be understood as having provided a model of that mechanism. Thus, under the
mechanistic view, a planetary orbit whose period is anomalous with respect to Kepler’s
Third Law would not constitute an anomaly in explanation, because no model of the
mechanism producing the orbit is mentioned in Kepler’s Third Law.
A comparison of the three views of anomaly is more complicated with regard to
their capacity to encompass various types of scientiﬁc explanation. As noted in § 2.3,
the linguistic view, which presupposes that successful explanation has the structure of
the D-N model, will not, as it stands, be helpful in determining if there are anomalies
arising from explanatory failures in functional analysis or in mechanistic explanation.
The perceptual view, in contrast, seems capable of including any type of scientiﬁc
explanation provided that it is exhibited in the exemplars of an actual scientiﬁc community.
A signiﬁcant limitation for the mechanistic view appears when one asks if there
are types of nomological explanation which fall outside its scope. Can it ultimately
account for anomalous phenomena when those phenomena are law-governed but not
mechanistically produced? Most would concede that the mechanistic view cannot.
Examples such as Kepler’s laws receiving a mechanistic explanation are inadequate
to justify a positive answer. Some of the crowning achievements in modern science
are explanatory laws so fundamental that a mechanistic explanation for them seems
unattainable. A typical example would be Maxwell’s equations. (This comparison between “mechanically explicable laws” and fundamental laws is an expansion on Glennan
2002, S348.) Thus, while the mechanistic view does comparatively well in not confusing non-explanatory anomalies for anomalies in explanation, it could still run the risk
of categorizing certain anomalies in explanation as non-explanatory anomalies.
That said, none of the mechanists discussed hold that mechanistic explanations
should replace nomological explanations generally. Concerning anomalies to funda47

mental laws, the mechanists are prepared to allow that the methods of discovery used
in mechanistic explanation may not be able to resolve them. But what is more important is that there is still plenty of room for conﬂict between the mechanistic and the
linguistic views. For example, things become especially interesting when mechanistic
explanation and nomological explanation appear to compete in the same ﬁeld, such as
in cognitive science. The mechanist may, for example, deny that certain psychological
laws have any explanatory power, whereas the nomologist disagrees. (For an analysis
of this tension between theories of explanation in cognitive science, see Bechtel and
Abrahamsen [forthcoming].) In such cases, someone holding the mechanistic view of
anomaly may in fact believe that certain anomalies are not anomalies in explanation
while someone holding a linguistic view of anomaly believes that they are.
The heuristic utility of the mechanistic view is relatively high with regard to the
conditions under which an anomaly can appear. Unlike the linguistic view, the mechanistic view does not have a language requirement insofar as models of mechanisms
generally do not have an inferential structure and their parts and interactions do not
need to be represented sententially. The predictive failure can be represented in modus
to'ens; but the explanatory relation between the predicted phenomenon and the mechanistic model need not be expressible as an instance of logical consistency.
Of course, some form of external representation is needed for mechanistic explanation. Temporal and spatial relations, and the coordination between the two, can usually be depicted most clearly by using visuospatial representations. Thus, the principle
component of a mechanistic model is often a diagram. As Bechtel and Abrahamsen
note, some might consider the ﬁgures in a scientiﬁc textbook to be there as a “crutch”
for the student. But one could not hold this opinion for long if confronted with scientiﬁc papers which present mechanistic explanations: there, language becomes the
“crutch,” as the caption or the text serve as commentary to the ﬁgures and would be
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unintelligible without the ﬁgures (2005, 426-427). The question here is not whether all
the information which is represented diagrammatically can or cannot be represented
linguistically. The question is whether the explanatory process can rely primarily on
visuospatial representation rather than on linguistic representation. If so, then the
mechanistic view of anomaly can allow that anomalies appear in virtue of diagrams
instead of deductive models. See § 5 for an example.
Bechtel and Abrahamsen argue for the importance of diagrams in mechanistic explanation for a second reason: so that the representation of a mechanism is isomorphic
to the reasoning that we perform about that mechanism. Inferential reasoning is biased towards systems whose interactions take place sequentially and whose parts act
separately (Hegarty 1992, cited in Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, 430), and indeed
treats simultaneous interactions of parts as sequential and separate. This makes the
task of reasoning backwards through a system particularly heavy and error-prone. Visuospatial reasoning, however, can cope more readily with systems involving multiple
simultaneous processes and feedback loops. Likewise, complex systems of this sort
can be represented more easily with diagrams and computer simulations than with
language.
The mechanistic view, then, has an heuristic advantage over the linguistic view in
that it can make use of both linguistic and visuospatial forms of explanation for the purpose of determining if there is an anomaly. It also has an advantage over the perceptual
view in that it provides communicative means for persuading others in the scientiﬁc
community that there is an anomaly. However, there is a way in which the perceptual
view and the mechanistic view can complement one another at this point. The perceptual view places emphasis on anomaly as an internal cognitive representation and
says little about the means of external representation by which other members of a scientiﬁc community are alerted to the anomaly (even though an anomaly only becomes
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“signiﬁcant” when the community recognizes it). At the same time, the perceptual
view invokes a model of the explanatory process which privileges pattern recognition.
One of the heuristic advantages of diagrammatic representation is that it facilitates
pattern recognition (Larkin and Simon 1987, cited in Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005,
430). Thus one holding the mechanistic view (or the linguistic view) is interested in
explanation as an external representation,18 from which it follows that anomaly too
should depend on an external representation. One holding the perceptual view could
still claim that an anomaly is a perceptual event involving pattern recognition; but she
would have to allow that the event depends as much on the mechanist’s diagram, that
is, on an external representation of the explanatory relation and of the anomaly, as on
any internal, gestalt-like representation.

For a full argument for why explanation should be conceived of in terms of external representations (as opposed to Paul Churchland’s internalist conception) see Bechtel (1996).
18
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§ 5. CAS( STuDY: TH( ANOMALY OF MACuLAR SPARING IN HuMAN
AND PRIMAT( VISION

Figure 2: Japanese soldier wounded from a 7.6 mm bullet fired from a Moisin Nagent
rifle with a muzzle velocity of 620 m/s. The localization of the lesion on the primary
visual cortex was facilitated by the high velocity, small calibre ammunition used in
the Russian army (Inouye 2000, 92).

In 1909, Tatsuji Inouye published in German a study of the eﬀects of lesions to the
primary visual cortex on visual perception. His study was among the ﬁrst to investigate how the spatial relationship of the retinal photoreceptors was preserved in the
primary visual cortex.19 His data was gathered during his tour as a medical oﬃcer in
the Russo-Japanese war from 1904-5. His duties included serving as an opthalmologist
and measuring the extent of vision loss to soldiers who had received gunshot wounds
to the head (so as to calculate insurance payouts). Inouye’s study encompasses thirty
19

My presentation of Inouye’s contribution is largely indebted to Leﬀ (2004).
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Figure 3: Vision loss (the dark areas) mapped onto the visual fields of each eye
(Inouye 2000, 64).

such cases. For each case, he determined the location of the lesion on the cortex and
traced the scotomata onto the visual ﬁeld of each eye (ﬁgure 3).
In § 5.1, I describe the mechanism underlying the partial loss of vision suﬀered by
this soldier. But before I do so, I would like to draw attention to a number of features of
the phenomenon to be explained which are apparent from ﬁgures 2 and 3. I highlight
these points in order to provide an example of the combined use of inferential and
visuospatial reasoning commonly used in mechanistic explanation. First, the visual
ﬁeld of each appears split down the middle, as the scotoma from the right side of
the visual ﬁeld of each eye traces a midline. Second, the shape of the scotomata for
each eye are very similar in shape. This suggests that the same lesion caused the near
complete blindness to the right side of both visual ﬁelds (a condition commonly called
hemianopsia); the same would hold for the scotoma in the left visual ﬁeld, which has
spared the central vision on that side. Thus, the right side of the visual ﬁeld of both
eyes would be represented in the same area of the cortex; likewise for the left side.
Third, the trajectory traveled by the bullet appears to show that the occipital lobe,
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where the primary visual cortex is found, was damaged more extensively on the left
side than on the right. This could further suggest the location of the representation
of the right visual ﬁeld in the primary visual cortex. I will now turn to the model of
the mechanism responsible for projecting a retinotopic map onto the primary visual
cortex.
5.1. SIMPLIFI(D MOD(L OF TH( M(CHANISM FOR R(PR(S(NTING TH( VISuAL FI(LD
ON TH( PRIMARY VISuAL CORT(X
5.1.1. EL(M(NTS OF A R(TINOTOPIC MAP. As observed by Kepler, the eye functions
like a pinhole camera, in that the eye’s lens is instrumental in capturing and inverting an
image which then falls onto a surface, the retina. (Here the analogy between a camera
and the visual processing system stops.)
The distinction between retinal image and visual ﬁeld is important for visual neuroscience (Kandel et al. 2000, 524). This is not only because the retinal image is an
inverted representation of the visual ﬁeld. A complete two-dimensional representation of the visual ﬁeld incorporates two retinal images, left and right, and is obtained
when both eyes ﬁxate on a single point and do not change position. This ﬁxation point
divides the visual ﬁeld into left and right hemiﬁelds. The retina is also divided into
temporal and nasal hemiretinas. A line can be traced from the ﬁxation point through
the center of the cornea and lens back to the midpoint of the retina, found at the fovea.
A retinal image of the left hemiﬁeld can be found in both left nasal and right temporal hemiretinas; but the right temporal hemiretinal image contains no information
about the extreme portion of the left hemiﬁeld; likewise for the left temporal hemiretinal image with respect to the right hemiﬁeld. The portion of the visual ﬁeld corresponding to the overlap between the two retinal images is called the binocular zone.
The extreme portions of the visual ﬁeld which correspond to information contained
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by only one of the two retinal images are called the monocular zones, or the temporal
crescents.
5.1.2. TH( OPTIC N(RV(S. Light from the visual ﬁeld is transduced by receptor cells
in the retina, which synapse with ﬁrst order bipolar neurons. These in turn synapse
with second order ganglion cells, whose axons gather and project out the optic disc
(the blindspot), become myelinated and form the optic nerve.
5.1.3. TH( OPTIC TRACTS. Sensory nerves decussate when they cross to the opposite
side of the brain. Fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and some small mammals have optic
nerves which decussate such that the entire optic nerve will project onto the contralateral brain hemisphere (Leﬀ 2004, 269). Some such vertebrates also have binocular
vision, particularly predators. They therefore have complete bilateral representation
of the visual ﬁeld within the binocular zone.
The two bilateral optic nerves in humans and most mammals semidecussate. The
optic nerve semidecussates when only one side of the optic nerve crosses, while the
other side projects to the ipsilateral brain hemisphere. Emanating out from the optic
disc, the optic nerves of both eyes gather at a point in the hypothalamus called the
optic chiasm (named by Galen for its χ shape). There the nerve ﬁbers from the nasal
hemiretinas cross and are bundled with those from the temporal hemiretinas, which
remain uncrossed. From there the right optic tract, which travels back to the thalamus and midbrain, is projected into by the left nasal hemiretinal and right temporal
hemiretinal nerve ﬁbers; the left tract is projected into by the right nasal hemiretinal
and left temporal hemiretinal nerve ﬁbers. Thus, a complete representation of each
hemiﬁeld is projected to the contralateral brain hemisphere. It is because each brain
hemisphere processes information in both retinas from the same hemiﬁeld that full
stereoscopic vision is possible (Leﬀ 2004, 269).
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From the optic chiasm, each optic tract follows three pathways into the sub-cortical
areas: in the midbrain, to the superior colliculus, which controls saccadic eye movement; and to the pretectum, which controls pupillary reﬂexes; and in the thalamus, to
the lateral geniculate nucleus. The spatial relationship of the retinal photoreceptors
is preserved in the LGN. From the lateral geniculate nuclei, the retinotopic map is
projected back to the primary visual cortex. Ninety percent of the optic tract leads to
the LGN. Damage to the pathway passing through the LGN directly will impact visual
perception, causing either partial or total vision loss.
5.1.4. TH( OPTIC RADIATIONS. After the LGN the retinotopic map is further split
into quadrants. Fibers from the LGN relaying the superior visual ﬁeld terminate in
the superior bank of the primary visual cortex, above the calcarine ﬁssure. The optic
radiations relaying the inferior visual ﬁeld (the Meyer’s loop) terminate in the inferior
bank, below the calcarine ﬁssure.
Next, in § 5.2, I will discuss how the above mechanistic model does and does not
account for how lesions to diﬀerent parts of the mechanism which represents the visual
ﬁeld on the cortical retina cause vision loss.
5.2. MACuLAR SPARING ANOMALY
As noted in § 4.4, because mechanistic explanation frequently relies on visuospatial
reasoning, anomalies under the mechanistic view should also appear in the process of
such reasoning. Here I have provided an example. I suggest that the reader attempts
to discern the anomaly based on the diagram in ﬁgure 4. Even if this should prove
too diﬃcult, please note how my subsequent description largely assumes that certain
spatial and temporal relationships have already been expressed in the diagram.
5.2.1. L(SION TO OPTIC N(RV( (1). Cutting the right optic nerve will prevent one from
seeing out of one’s right eye. However, monocular vision of the entire visual ﬁeld (with
the exception of the right temporal crescent) is retained.
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Figure 4: Types of vision loss caused by lesions to parts of the central visual pathway
(Kandel et al. 2000, 544).

5.2.2. L(SION TO OPTIC CHIASM (2). A lesion to the optic chiasm will impact the
contralateral retinal projections but will have no eﬀect on the ipsilateral projections.
Therefore, the right eye sees only the left hemiﬁeld, whereas the left sees only the right
hemiﬁeld. This condition is known as nonhomonymous hemianopsia, since the deﬁcit
occurs to a diﬀerent side of the visual ﬁeld for each eye.
5.2.3. L(SION TO OPTIC TRACT (3). A lesion to the right optic tract will impact the
ipsilateral and contralateral projections which relay the retinotopic map for the left
hemiﬁeld. The condition is known as homonymous hemianopsia, since the deﬁcit occurs
to the same side of the visual ﬁeld for both eyes.
5.2.4. L(SION TO OPTIC RADIATION (4). Cutting the Meyer’s loop on the right side
will cause vision loss in the upper quadrant of the visual ﬁeld, as the inferior half of
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the retinotopic map (which is inverted) is relayed by the inferior optic radiations. The
condition is known as upper contralateral quadrantic anopsia.
5.2.5. L(SIONS TO VISuAL CORT(X (5) AND (6). These lesions are located on the upper
and lower banks of the calcarine ﬁssure, where the primary visual cortex if found.
Lesions to the primary visual cortex should result in vision loss like that caused by
lesions to the optic radiations. Notice though that the foveal area of the visual ﬁeld
has been spared. This phenomenon is known as macular sparing.

Figure 5: Bilateral representation of foveal region of visual field (Inouye 2000, 92).

5.2.6. EXPLORATION OF TH( ANOMALY. Ever since Inouye’s study, macular sparing
has been an anomaly for the model of the mechanism for representing the retinotopic
image on the primary visual cortex. Those who have explored the possibility that
macular sparing is a theoretical anomaly have focused on revising the model above to
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allow for bilateral representation of the foveal area of the visual ﬁeld. For example, this,
in fact, was the approach that Inouye took. Notice in ﬁgure 5 that his map of primary
visual cortex in a single hemisphere includes an area of -5º to 0º, which corresponds
to the foveal area of the ipsilateral visual hemiﬁeld. Inouye’s attempted resolution has
not been accepted, however, because he largely underestimated the quantity of visual
cortex devoted to the foveal area: nearly half of the primary visual cortex functions
to represent this area. Others have explored the anomaly as a factual: for example,
Leventhal et al. have sought to explain the “age-old problem of macular sparing and
splitting”(1988, 67) in terms of a retinal mechanism. Nonetheless, many have rejected
the notion that bilateral representation exists (in particular, see Leﬀ 2004, 277), and a
major textbook now considers it to be a phenomenal anomaly due to unreliable data,
namely, incomplete cortical lesions (Kandel et al. 2000, 544).
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§ 6. COMPARISON OF VI(WS WITH R(SP(CT TO TH(IR H(uRISTIC
UTILITY IN D(T(RMINING WHICH KIND OF ANOMALY IN
EXPLANATION TH(R( IS
6.1. ANOMALY LOCALIZATION
In the linguistic view of anomaly, the D-N and theory falsiﬁcation models represent
possible causes of the anomaly and are therefore useful in localizing the anomaly within
the explanatory model. If the anomaly is theoretical, then one could look to the laws,
explanatory theories, or interpretative theories used in the model. If the anomaly is
factual, one could scrutinize the initial conditions, auxiliary hypotheses, or if need
be, attempt to determine if the ceteris paribus clause is true. The major shortcoming
of the linguistic view concerns phenomenal anomalies. Since one can claim to know
that there is an anomaly iﬀ the anomaly statement Oanomaly,S is true, it seems as though
phenomenal anomalies are no longer on the table under the linguistic view (unless the
truth conditions of the anomaly statement allows for the possibility that it is true even
while the phenomenon to which it refers can be proven not to exist).
In contrast, according to the perceptual view, one can claim to know that there
is an anomaly as soon as one is ready to admit that the phenomenon one perceives
does not ﬁt one’s set of expectations. Thus, phenomenal anomalies are by deﬁnition
allowed, even if they are never considered “signiﬁcant.” Hence, in the perceptual view,
anomaly localization seems to happen in stages, during which a scientiﬁc community
overcomes its bias against recognizing theoretical anomalies. The scientist (and if not
her, then the scientiﬁc community to which she belongs) has an acquired disposition
towards believing, so the view goes, that phenomena which appear anomalous do not
really exist. In other words, all anomalies at the outset are treated as phenomenal.
Meanwhile, it is assumed that the paradigm is true. Only after a certain period of
persistence will the possibility that the anomaly is theoretical be entertained. The
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perceptual view is of little help, however, in localizing anomalies as either factual and
theoretical: both kinds tend to collapse together as sets of expectations consisting
indiﬀerently of particular explanatory facts and theories. (See § 6.4 regarding the
perceptual view of factual anomaly.)
The mechanistic view oﬀers, in certain respects, a synthesis of the preceding two
views. Like the perceptual view (particularly in its cognitive interpretation) the mechanistic view allows one to claim that there is an anomaly as soon as one recognizes as
much. Thus, it is not necessary to rule out the possibility of a phenomenal anomaly in
order for the claim that there is one to be true. And like the linguistic view, the mechanistic view allows one to make careful distinctions between factual and theoretical
anomalies. Because mechanisms do not occur in isolation in nature, many additional
factors come into play when we try to isolate them in order to model them. For this
reason, among others, when resolving an anomaly in mechanistic explanation, it is crucial to be able to separate potential problems with one’s model of the mechanism from
erroneous set-up conditions or an inadequate list of relevant factors external to the
mechanism. The heuristic utility of the mechanistic view is manifested in the fact that
from the point in time when it is determined that there is an anomaly to the moment
when a successful explanation is found for the anomalous phenonemon, every kind of
anomaly is, in principle, on the table for exploration.
6.2. EXPLORATION OF TH(OR(TICAL ANOMALI(S
All three views oﬀer some useful heuristics for resolving theoretical anomalies. In the
linguistic view, the distinction between interpretative and explanatory theories opens
up a couple of paths. Revisions to the interpretative theories which would make the
theory group consistent could be suggested and compared. Furthermore, interpretative theories which have been tacitly assumed could be discovered and articulated.
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In the perceptual view, another way of exploring theoretical anomalies is open. A
theoretical anomaly may be resolvable by revising how a law-schema has been applied
to a particular situation. Especially in complex situations, there may be several ways in
which a law-schema could be adapted; in the case of a theoretical anomaly, one could try
employing or discovering diﬀerent instantiations of the law-schema (see Kuhn [1962]
1996, 101-102).
The mechanistic view includes a similar, but more elaborate distinction. Oftentimes several models, which are testable individually, share a common mechanism
schema. Mechanism schemata are abstract, and when they are instantiated they yield
mechanistic explanations (Machamer et al. 2000, 15-18). Furthermore, there are schemata
which are more abstract than others. For example, an abstract mechanism schema for
protein synthesis could consist of three parts—DNA, RNA, and protein—and three
activities—duplication, transcription, and translation; more detailed models would become progressively less abstract (Machamer et al. 2000, 15-16).20 Resolution of theoretical anomalies will typically begin with revision of the least abstract model instantiated
and continue with the more abstract as long as the anomaly persists. Ultimately the
most basic form of the schema may be rejected in favor of another.
When a scientist encounters an anomaly caused by a mechanistic model, it is likely
that she can search for the resolution of the anomaly in lower-level mechanisms. Mechanisms are often nested in one another hierarchically. The mechanistic model of pupillary reﬂex presented in § 4.1 does not describe individual neurons and their interactions,
nor electrochemical phenomena and their underlying mechanisms. If the model of the
Abstraction should not be conflated here with generality. As Machamer, Darden, and Craver
point out, a protein synthesis schema for RNA retroviruses (e.g., RNA→DNA→RNA→protein)
could be just as abstract but less general than the schema for protein synthesis at the core of
molecular biology (2000, 16).
20
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pupillary reﬂex failed in a prediction, the scientist could attempt to resolve the anomaly
at a lower level.
For the purpose of this comparison, I have not found a decisive criterion which
selects one view as heuristically more useful for exploring theoretical anomalies. A
possible reason is that views of anomaly are typically geared towards confronting theoretical anomalies. One might complain that the fact that the perceptual view does not
cleanly localize factual and theoretical anomalies could lead to frustration for exploring
theoretical anomalies, but this shortcoming should be less a problem in this context
than in the context of factual anomalies. One might also point out that one has more
options when revising mechanistic models than when revising laws; laws can easily be
revised, but they can just as easily lose their explanatory power. Even if the claim is intuitively compelling, it is highly debatable. One could also claim that the mechanistic
view provides little help for exploring theoretical anomalies to non-causal laws. This
is true, but there are enough laws which are mechanically explicable that it is worth
comparing the heuristic utility of the two views. But for the moment, it appears that
all three views prove to have heuristic utility for exploring theoretical anomalies.
6.3. EXPLORATION OF PH(NOM(NAL ANOMALI(S
In discussing phenomenal anomalies, beginning in § 1.3.1, I have made use of a distinction between data and phenomena. Furthermore, I have listed “anomalous data
points” as non-explanatory anomalies in § 1.2.3. The distinction is one that I have
adopted from Bogen and Woodward (1988); it would be helpful to explicate it further
before moving on to consider the resources the views have for exploring phenomenal
anomalies.
Bogen and Woodward distinguish between data and phenomena in terms of (1)
observation and (2) prediction:
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Data, which play the role of evidence for the existence of phenomena, for
the most part can be straightforwardly observed. However, data typically
cannot be predicted or systematically explained by theory. By contrast,
well-developed scientiﬁc theories do predict and explain facts about phenomena. Phenomena are detected through the use of data, but in most
cases are not observable in any interesting sense of that term. (1988, 305306)
Let’s consider an example of a phenomenon predicted by a group of theories, for
which we have decent evidence, but which has never been observed: extra-solar planets. Theories of planetary system formation in conjunction with estimates of the size
and makeup of the universe predict the presence of large numbers of extrasolar planets. But their size and distance from Earth make them extremely diﬃcult to observe
directly. Instead, indirect methods such as astrometry (measuring the visible wobble of the parent star) or radial velocity (measuring the Doppler eﬀect caused by a
wobbling parent star) are used in their discovery. Thus, the existence of extrasolar
planets is a predictable phenomenon, one which has abundant evidence in its favor
(154 likely candidates have been discovered), but which has never been observed with
eye or telescope.
Bogen and Woodward also maintain their distinction with respect to phenomena
which seem readily observable. For example, as Nagel claims, one might expect to be
able to observe the melting point of lead: when one sees the lead sample melt, read
the thermometer. However, what one observes is data point somewhere in the vicinity
of 327ºC. The facts and theories which would explain why lead melts at 327ºC do not
suﬃce to explain why the thermometer reads what it does. Bogen and Woodward
remark:
It is easy to see that a theory of molecular structure which explains why the
melting point of lead is approximately 327 degrees could not possibly explain why the actual data-points occurred. The outcome of any given application of a thermometer to a lead sample depends not only on the melting
63

point of lead, but also on its purity, on the workings of the thermometer,
on the way in which it was applied and read, on interactions between the
initial temperature of the thermometer and that of the sample, and a variety of other background conditions. [To measure the temperature at which
a single sample of lead melts, the observer must take a reading just as the
melting begins. A standard method is to put a small amount of ﬁnely powdered metal in a thin piece of capillary tube. A thermometer sensor (for
example, a thin piece of wire connected to a thermocouple) is ﬁxed to the
outside of the tube. When the sample begins to melt, it vaporizes, changing the color of the tube. The observer records the thermometer reading as
soon as he notices a color change. No matter how thin the capillary tube,
there is always enough space between the lead and the sensor to guarantee
a discrepancy between the temperature of the sample and the reading. No
matter how attentive the observer may be, there is no guarantee that he
will be able to tell precisely when the sample ﬁrst begins to melt.] (1988,
309-310)
The data–phenomenon distinction is pertinent to our comparison of views of phenomenal anomaly in several ways. First, it recalls a deﬁciency in the heuristic prospects
of the linguistic view. The linguistic view does not provide a coherent account of how
Oanomaly,S should be veriﬁed. Yet it is precisely the move from data to phenomenon
which should allow us to say that anomaly statements are true. Lakatos, with his distinction between interpretative and explanatory theories, comes close; still, he does
not address himself to phenomenal anomalies. On his reading, the claim that chlorine
had an atomic weight of 35.5 was not a phenomenal anomaly: the data were neither
unreliable nor misinterpreted. Rather, the chlorine samples were impure because the
theory of chemical purity had changed.
Second, the data–phenomenon distinction underlines a similar oversight in the
perceptual view. The perceptual view is primarily focused on how a theory determines
phenomena in such a way that they appear explainable, explained, or anomalous. But
in doing so, it has managed to ignore the data–phenomenon distinction: phenomena
are observable and data are predictable. One might defend the perceptual view by
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pointing out, on the one hand, that a Kuhnian paradigm qua disciplinary matrix includes
experimental techniques (so paradigms do predict data), and on the other, that we still
have a lot to learn about what role perception plays in recognizing explanatory patterns
(so phenomena are observable). Nevertheless, the perceptual view provides no clear
means for exploring phenomenal anomalies.
Finally, the data-phenomenon distinction brings out a clear advantage of the mechanistic view. What Bogen and Woodward have provided in the passage above is a
rough mechanistic explanation of a reading of the melting point of lead. In fact, they
have diﬀerentiated between two diﬀerent phenomena: one is the melting point of
lead, the other is the measurement of the temperature of a lead sample. The second
phenomenon is produced by a mechanism with all the parts listed above (thermocouple, sensor, capillary tube, lead, so on), which carry out certain activities or undergo
certain changes in properties. Notice that if there is an underlying mechanism which
produces the ﬁrst phenomenon, the melting point of lead, then that mechanism is also
a part of the mechanism which produces the second phenomenon.
To explore a phenomenal anomaly, one can treat data as mechanistically-produced
phenomena, provide a mechanistic explanation of them, and thereby discover how
the bad data were produced.21 Here we are describing a routine aspect of scientiﬁc
practice, troubleshooting the experimental set-up. A scientist, when confronted with
an anomaly, will typically re-examine her instrumentation. To understand the point
scatter, one should understand the mechanism which produces the points. Thus, the
mechanistic view of anomaly, unlike the other views, allows one to use its explanatory
resources as a method of discovery, namely, for exploring and resolving phenomenal
anomalies.
It remains to be seen how a view of anomaly might prove useful when resolving phenomenal
anomalies caused by misinterpretation of data.
21
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6.4. EXPLORATION OF FACTuAL ANOMALI(S
As mentioned in § 6.1, the perceptual view tends to conﬂate factual and theoretical
anomalies. This in fact is due to a deliberate interpretive choice on the part of Kuhn.
He often refers to certain examples of “unexpected discoveries” which, he claims,
blur the line between resolved factual and resolved theoretical anomalies: Priestley’s
discovery of oxygen, Herschel’s discovery of Uranus, and Roentgen’s discovery of X
rays (Kuhn 1977, 165-177). Since it is not clear to me that the discoveries of oxygen
and of X rays were not simply resolutions of theoretical anomalies, I will focus on
Herschel’s discovery. In 1781, Herschel was convinced that he had found a new comet
and persisted in his belief until Lexell insisted that the data provided evidence not for
a cometary orbit, but rather for a planetary orbit. It appears that Herschel and others
were operating in a six-planet paradigm, one which had been in eﬀect since at least the
earliest astronomical records to which we have access. However, the claim that the
solar system has seven planets instead of six refers to a particular fact, albeit one that
is highly relevant to the explanations of a number of astronomical phenomena. But it
does nothing to alter the prevailing paradigm, which was Newtonian mechanics. What
makes Kuhn argue that the discovery of Uranus was theoretically signiﬁcant was that it
was unexpected or unpredictable given the current beliefs of the scientiﬁc community.22
Hoyningen-Huene elaborates:
To be sure, as Kuhn notes in SSR, the distinction between the unexpected
discovery of new phenomena or entities and revolutions in theory is artiﬁcial, for two reasons. First, superﬁcial appearances to the contrary, both
cases involve changes on the theory level. Second, the discovery of new
facts may herald the replacement of a previously accepted theory, and conversely, the replacement of a previously accepted theory may lead to or be
accompanied by unexpected discoveries. (1993, 228)
One explanation for Kuhn’s interpretation of these discoveries could be that his model of
anomaly resolution was the Copernican revolution, an event encompassing the concomitant resolutions of both factual and explanatory anomalies (1957).
22
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But neither Kuhn nor Hoyningen-Huene explain why unexpectedness should be a
suﬃcient condition for the resolution of a factual anomaly to have theoretical import.
This is important because the conﬂation of theoretical and factual anomalies limits the
heuristic utility of the perceptual view when exploring factual anomalies. The obstacles scientists face when resolving theoretical anomalies would automatically turn up
in the context of factual anomalies. But these obstacles cannot be reduced to nothing more than a paradigmatic set of expectations. Indeed, historically, many scientists
have shown themselves entirely willing to revise or replace their theories; yet their willingness does little to attenuate the exceptional diﬃculty of resolving many theoretical
anomalies.
The heuristic utility of the linguistic view for exploring factual anomalies is signiﬁcant. To explore a factual anomaly, one holding this view begins by assuming that the
theory statements are true. One then proceeds to examine one’s auxiliary hypotheses,
to see both if they are complete (a step which is equivalent to checking if the ceteris
paribus clause has been corroborated) as well as if they are true. The well-known problem of verifying individual statements still hamstrings this process, but it is still far
more practical to prove that an auxiliary hypothesis is false or that the ceteris paribus
clause has not been satisﬁed than that all the auxiliary hypotheses are true. Thus,
it does happen that one can demonstrate that an initial condition is erroneous, that
some relevant factor has not been taken account, or that some other assumption which
remained tacit needs to be explicitly interrogated.
The mechanistic view incorporates the same explanatory factual elements in conjunction with models of mechanisms as the linguistic view does with law statements.
Mechanists refer as well to auxiliary hypotheses and the ceteris paribus clause. However, the explanatory resources available in the mechanistic view provide a deﬁnite
advantage. It relates to Hoyningen-Huene’s remark above. A discovery resulting from
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an attempt to resolve a factual anomaly in the context of mechanistic explanation will
frequently have theoretical consequences. Finding that an external factor has not been
accounted for usually involves actually discovering that external factor, and that factor
is typically a mechanism itself or a part of some mechanism. Here are two examples.
Research on blindsight can be understood as the exploration of a factual anomaly
which has had theoretical consequences. The central visual pathway in humans and
primates is arranged such there is a complete representation of the visual ﬁeld in the
primary visual cortex, which is found at the occipital lobe. The primary visual cortex
projects to various anterior areas of the brain where specialized processing of that
representation takes place. This is the mechanism which produces our vision. A small
lesion to the primary visual cortex will result in blindness in a region of the visual
ﬁeld; a large enough lesion will result in complete blindness. Researchers have found
cases, however, in which patients, who have received lesions in the primary visual
cortex, are still able to respond to information in an area of their visual ﬁeld where
they are blind. One way of exploring this anomaly is to assume that the model of
the mechanism whereby a retinal image is projected to the primary visual cortex does
not need revision; instead, an external factor needs to be accounted for. In this case,
we know that 10% of the optic tract does not project through the lateral geniculate
nuclei back to the primary visual cortex; rather, it projects to the midbrain regions, the
pretectum, which controls pupillary reﬂex, and the superior colliculus, which controls
saccadic eye movement. Blindsight could be due to the retinal projections to the
superior colliculus. Thus, these projections could constitute a relevant external factor,
and moreover, a function for them may have been discovered as a result of testing the
model of mechanism responsible for vision.
The second example is more of a thought experiment for comparing mechanistic
and nomological models of explanation. Let’s return to the discovery of Neptune.
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Ever since 1846, it has been applauded ﬁrst in newspapers and then in textbooks as
a triumph for Newtonian physics insofar as the resolved anomaly and the successful
prediction seemed to conﬁrm the theory. Philosophers of science have made the point
repeatedly that such beliefs are incoherent and theory conﬁrmation is a unsalvageable
enterprise. Thus, for the linguistic view, the resolution of this factual anomaly in fact
has no theoretical signiﬁcance. The number of planets in a solar system is a matter of
indiﬀerence to the truth of gravitational laws.
But now suppose that Uranus’ orbit was regarded not merely as a law-governed
phenomenon, but as mechanistically produced phenomenon. Thus the various bodies
in the solar system are parts which interact in various ways. Discovery of a new part
would have theoretical signiﬁcance insofar as a model of a mechanism including that
part would require revision. And such a mechanism need not be conceived of as a
sort of Cartesian clockwork. Instead we could model the mechanism which in fact
produced Uranus and Neptune and their orbital motion. Let the set-up conditions for
the model include a solar nebula, a rotating cloud of stardust and gas. The gravitational
pull which the cloud particles exert on each other cause the entire cloud to contract
towards the center and form a dense region known as a protosun. Cloud matter continues to be pulled in towards the protosun, which converts the gravitational energy
into thermal energy according to Kelvin-Helmholtz contraction. As the cloud collapses around the protosun, its rotational velocity increases; the cloud also ﬂattens out
forming a disk. Eventually, the temperatures of the protosun become high enough that
nuclear reactions take place and the protosun becomes a star. The K-H contraction
ceases. Planets then form from the protoplanetary disk orbiting the Sun. Owing to
the temperature diﬀerential across the inner and outer parts of the solar system (from
2000K to 50K), elements with high condensation temperatures remain near the sun
whereas lighter elements liquify or solidify only in the outer solar system. Collisions be69

tween particles form planetesimals which in turn accrete to form protoplanets. Thus,
the terrestrial planets and the Jovian planets diﬀer according to chemical composition
and size. But oddly, unlike Jupiter and Saturn, Uranus and Neptune have diﬀerent
chemical abundances of hydrogen and helium than the Sun, and they have a higher
proportions of heavier elements. This is probably because these two planets formed
much closer to the Sun than where they are located today, but the gravitational eﬀects
of Jupiter and Saturn pushed them out.
This could be a mechanistic explanation for Neptune’s and Uranus’ orbits. Unlike
a gravitational law, it actually describes the sequence of causal interactions underlying
the two gas giants now following their present orbits. While it is true that many of the
interactions between the parts are law-governed, the phenomena of planetary formation, migration, even orbiting, are explained in terms of parts and their interactions.
The aim of this redescription of a law-governed phenomenon as a mechanistically
produced phenomenon has been to compare the heuristic utility of the two views
of anomaly. On the one hand, the discovery of Neptune, as we pointed out earlier,
has no theoretical signiﬁcance with respect to the nomological explanation of Uranus’
orbit. On the other hand, the resolution of that factual anomaly does have theoretical
consequences in relation to the mechanistic explanation of Uranus’ orbit. Namely, an
unknown relevant factor perturbing Uranus’ orbit was also an unknown part of the
solar system qua mechanism. As a result, the model of that mechanism undergoes a
revision in response to the resolution of a factual anomaly.
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§ 7. CONCLuSION
In presenting these three views of anomaly and comparing them with respect to their
heuristic utility, my stated goal was to show that the mechanistic view, as it stands,
has the most resources both for determining that there is an anomaly and which kind
of anomaly it is. It should be clear though that the mechanistic view adopts many of
the features of the linguistic and perceptual views. (It would have been awkward to
present these views in the reverse order.) It would be interesting to see how the linguistic and perceptual views could be strengthened in light of the challenges presented
by the mechanistic view. A linguistic view could be reconstructed with less deference
to history and with a more sophisticated approach to the logic of explanation. Advances in that view will continue to be helpful even for those who do not believe that
anomalies are always expressible as logical inconsistencies, since many are. Moreover,
the linguistic view provides the most insight into anomalies appearing in the context
of nomological explanations of mechanically inexplicable phenomena.
The perceptual view could clearly be improved by using more recent cognitive
science. However, it seems to me that the perceptual view needs to be split into two
research programs. One was suggested by Dr. Ramachandran, where he discusses a
possible neurological basis for anomalies within paradigms:
The left hemisphere’s job is to create a belief system or model and to fold
new experiences into that belief system. …When the anomalous information reaches a certain threshold, the right hemisphere decides that it is
time to force a complete revision of the entire model and start from scratch.
The right hemisphere thus forces a “Kuhnian paradigm shift” in response
to anomalies, whereas the left hemisphere always tries to cling tenaciously
to the way things were. (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998, 136)
Wherever Dr. Ramachandran’s investigation into the neurological mechanisms underlying denial goes, he does isolate a prevalent symptom of working within an explana71

tory paradigm, namely, denial towards anomalies. This, it seems to me, deserves to
be investigated all by itself, rather than being tied to a particular theory of scientiﬁc
explanation. Someone can be in denial about the presence of an anomaly no matter
which model of explanation he or she employs. One can confabulate a successful D-N
explanation as well as a mechanistic explanation to avoid an anomaly. But scientists are
not in denial every time they pursue a method of anomaly resolution which does not
involve questioning their explanatory theories. The decision to explore an anomaly as
though it were of a certain kind can be made based on many diﬀerent factors which
have nothing to do with feeling that an anomaly is threatening one’s world view. Thus,
the second research program suggested by the perceptual view would be to investigate
further how cognitive agents, independently of any denial mechanisms, come to recognize that an anomaly is present. In this thesis, I have brought in cognitive notions such
as pattern recognition, inferential reasoning, visuospatial and linguistic representation,
and so on, but clearly this discussion of anomaly recognition should be taken much
further.
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